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Jason Port – State or Nonstate: The Wagner Group’s Role in Contemporary Intrastate Conflicts 
Worldwide 
(Under the direction of Chair Milada Vachudova) 
 
The Wagner Group has long benefitted from ambiguity about its relationship with the 
Russian government. This ambiguity has helped it aggressively pursue Russian foreign policy 
interests worldwide. In this article, I argue that the Wagner Group is a state actor and should be 
recognized as such by the West. I present four cases of Wagner involvement in intrastate 
conflicts. I demonstrate that, across all cases, the Group is fully integrated into Russia’s foreign 
policy infrastructure, benefits from all the resources and privileges of a state actor, closely 
coordinates with Russian state organs, and exhibits near-ubiquitous coordination with Russian 
interests. I draw on Open-Source Russian and English-language primary materials, including 
leaked video and audio, investigative journalism, interviews, and social media. Understanding 
and labeling Wagner as a Russian state actor is a first critical first step in countering and 
dispelling ambiguities surrounding the Wagner Group that have enabled the Russian government 
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Shooting their way through Eastern Ukraine, assassinating journalists in the Central 
African Republic, quashing the Syrian democratic opposition, propping up Libyan strongmen - 
these are just some of the Wagner Group's functions. This band of unmarked Russian 
paramilitaries has a global operational scope, and its growing role in intrastate conflicts 
worldwide highlights its growing impact on global affairs. Therefore, it is imperative that the 
United States and its allies better understand the Wagner Group’s role as a Russian state actor, its 
complete operational scope worldwide, and how to best respond to the threat it poses to U.S. and 
allied interests. Without taking the first step of labeling the Group, Wagner will continue to 
operate globally, pursuing the Kremlin’s interests with near-total plausible deniability, 
weakening international norms and laws, and threatening the interests of the U.S. and its allies.  
Since its 2014 debut during the war in Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the 
Wagner Group has become the Russian Federation's premier private military company (PMC), 
facing little domestic competition, expanding globally, and evolving to be capable of conducting 
full spectrum operations. The nature of warfare is constantly evolving, and the tools with which a 
state wages war vary and develop over time. A contemporary global proliferation of intrastate 
conflicts has provided ample opportunity for the Wagner Group to integrate itself into the 
Kremlin’s foreign and military policy toolkit. However, unlike some of Russia’s more 
conventional tools, the Wagner Group brings with it a perplexing feeling of geopolitical anomie. 
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Therefore, while PMCs have been employed by myriad states and have long participated in both 
interstate and intrastate conflicts, the Wagner Group represents a uniquely contemporary 
geopolitical tool – the hybrid-PMC.  
Hybrid-PMCs are private military companies that are subordinate to the state and serve 
one or more critical functions of government while retaining their designation as private entities, 
consequently benefitting from this designation. How can the international community overcome 
this ambiguity (or eliminate it) and establish new norms, set new precedent, and construct new 
policies that direct future responses to hybrid-PMCs? In the context of this thesis, I use the term 
'ambiguity' to refer to Wagner's existence and operation outside the realm of international norms. 
These norms include setting rules of engagement, accountability for war crimes, and clearly 
defined combatant status. In turn, this 'ambiguity' also refers to the lack of experience on the part 
of the U.S. and the international community with how to define and how to respond to such 
groups. While the U.S. has interacted with and contracted PMCs and other nonstate actors in the 
past, its experience with these groups is not comparable to the current situation with Wagner.1 
Within the context of intrastate conflicts, it is especially difficult for state-based or 
international observers to determine whether such entities serve as state or nonstate-actors. This 
hampers the calibration of an appropriate military and foreign policy or covert action response to 
Wagner Group activity. Despite its increasingly integral role in Russian military and foreign 
policy, the Kremlin continues to deny any official relationship between the Russian state and the 
Wagner Group hybrid-PMC. While this ambiguity serves the Kremlin’s interests, it is inherently 
contradictory given the rapid expansion of the Wagner Group’s worldwide presence and 
 
1 In previous work, I investigate the similarities and differences between the Wagner Group and Blackwater PMC. 
While the two shared similar origins, they quickly evolved into radically different entities. Blackwater, a nonstate 
actor, remained a PMC, whereas the Wagner Group, a state actor, developed into a hybrid-PMC. “A Tale of Two 
Private Military Companies: Blackwater versus the Wagner Group”; Dr. Graeme Robertson; May 2020.  
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operational capacity. With its earlier operations taking place in Ukraine and Syria, the Wagner 
Group now has a prominent role in the Libyan intrastate conflict and is present in states 
throughout the Global South, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique, 
Madagascar, Venezuela, and Sudan. While there are other states in which the Wagner Group has 
been suspected of operating, this is the list of fully confirmed areas of operation. In these states, 
Wagner has engaged in a wide variety of military and paramilitary activities including but not 
limited to the provision of shockwave troops, traditional military support, rent-seeking 
paramilitary operations, training of local insurgents, and assassinations.  
The combination of deep ambiguity about the character of the Wagner Group coupled 
with its vast geographical and operational scope has culminated in a series of strange events. For 
example, a skirmish between Wagner forces and U.S. military personnel took place in Northeast 
Syria, which resulted in hundreds of Wagner casualties.2 In spite of the skirmish, the Russian 
government persistently refuted any affiliation with the Wagner forces.3 A more recent incident 
took place in Libya in which Wagner forces assaulting Tripoli were killed in an airstrike 
conducted by coalition forces supporting the UN-backed government in Libya.4 Major players in 
the coalition include Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but attributing responsibility for specific 
airstrikes has proven difficult.5 As with the 2018 Syrian example, the Russian government has 
provided no official response other than plans to repatriate the bodies.6 This ambiguity 
surrounding its relationship with the Wagner Group has served and continues to serve Russian 
 
2 Hauer 2018.  
 
3 Gibbons-Neff 2018.  
 
4 Dettmer 2019.  
 
5 Ryan 2020.  
 
6 Avilov 2019.  
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foreign policy interests. However, it is in the interest of the United States to dispel the ambiguity 
and curtail the benefits it provides to Russian foreign policy. This thesis aims to serve as a 
critical first step towards that goal. This thesis illuminates the importance of clearly labeling the 
Wagner Group as a state or a nonstate actor, thus understanding how to more appropriately 
calibrate responses to its activities, how to discern when to draw the line, and how to estimate the 
potential for Russian military or foreign policy blowback.  
 Should the Wagner Group be categorized as a state or nonstate-actor when engaging in 
intrastate conflicts globally? To date, no official designation has been applied to the Wagner 
Group by either a state-based or international actor. While it is widely acknowledged by states 
and other observers (media, journalists, academia, etc.) that the Wagner Group is operating at the 
direction of the Kremlin, does the ambiguity under which it operates mean it can be treated as a 
nonstate-actor by entities with conflicting interests? Moreover, as Vladimir Putin attempts to 
operate outside the realm of international norms via entities such as the Wagner Group and the 
Internet Research Agency, is it strategically disadvantageous to deny such entities the protections 
attributed to state representatives?  
 I show in this thesis that although the Kremlin continues to deny any affiliation with it, 
the Wagner Group consistently serves Russian military and foreign policy interests. It is financed 
and directed by the prominent Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin who has close political and 
personal ties with Vladimir Putin. 
 I argue, moreover, that the Wagner Group is a state actor and should be recognized as 
such by the international community and the West.7 I also argue that when Western interests 
 
7 When using the terms ‘international community’ and ‘the West’ in this thesis, I am referring to global conflict 
resolution actors (including, but not limited to the U.N. and other pertinent NGOs/IGOs) and the U.S./EU/NATO, 
respectively. My usage of ‘the West’ generally involves the liberal-democratic states that exist within these 
groupings. 
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conflict with Wagner operations, a more aggressive approach is necessary. The Kremlin's global 
hybrid warfare campaign relies on the disregard for international norms and the use of secondary 
or tertiary actors operating under a veil of plausible deniability when pursuing its military, 
foreign policy, or economic interests abroad. Dispelling Wagner’s ambiguity would greatly 
disrupt the Kremlin’s global campaign of hybrid war.  
Why would designating the Wagner Group as a state actor matter? I expect that a series 
of declarations designating the Wagner Group a state actor coupled with an increasingly 
aggressive Western response to Wagner activities would trigger one of two important responses 
by the Russian government. The Kremlin may find that the cost of using hybrid PMCs rises 
while their effectiveness declines, which may prompt a shift to more standard and legitimate 
tools for pursuing its interests abroad. Alternatively, the Kremlin may adjust its public stance on 
Wagner, acknowledging that the hybrid-PMC is part of the state and therefore likely bringing it 
under the purview of international norms.  
The study of Wagner Group within academia is new and underdeveloped, with the 
earliest work published in 2014 and 2015. Three key debates that have emerged within the 
literature on Wagner Group are whether it serves one particular purpose or a broad collection of 
Russian state interests, whether it is acting at the direction of the Kremlin or independently in 
these intrastate and rent-seeking conflicts, and whether it can be classified as a PMC or 
something else entirely. 
 To shed light on how the activities of the Wagner Group directly serve the Kremlin, I 
present case studies that unpack the intrastate conflicts in which the Wagner Group has been 
involved. I draw from a variety of source material, using both primary and secondary sources. 
Among many primary sources, I have incorporated information from leaked video and audio of 
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Wagner activities including planning sessions; interviews with former Wagner fighters and their 
associates that have been published online; and posts on social media by groups that track 
Wagner’s activities. Nearly all of these primary sources I have consulted are in Russian. 
Additionally, I consult newspaper articles, both in English and Russian. Investigative journalists 
have played an important role in shedding light on the activities of the Wagner Group, and I 
draw on their work in both English and Russian language sources. I also draw on an extensive 
array of secondary sources: I consult a variety of government publications, academic journal 
articles, and articles posted by think tanks and policy institutes that help us understand the 
Wagner Group and the complex conflict zones where they have been active.   
The rest of this thesis is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter I, I discuss what we know 
about the Wagner Group. This includes aspects such as Wagner's history, evolution, the key 
individuals involved (both private and public) and how they are interconnected, and its present 
capacity to conduct covert action, paramilitary operations, and traditional military activity. The 
last point involves logistics, finance, political capital, transportation, and other related items of 
interest. Next, I discuss the debate regarding whether the Wagner Group should be designated a 
state or nonstate actor, the importance of labeling the Group in this way, and the criteria by 
which Wagner will be examined when conclusions are drawn regarding its status as one of the 
two aforementioned actors.  
In Chapter II, I show in what ways the Wagner Group is a tool of contemporary Russian 
foreign policy. I sketch the central goals of Russian foreign policy and demonstrate how the 
Wagner Group helps the Kremlin make progress toward fulfilling each one. I explore how 
theories of international relations can best help us understand the Kremlin's strategies and goals 
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on the world stage and how the Wagner Group fits in. I have included this chapter to demonstrate 
the critical importance of the Wagner Group in the Kremlin's pursuit of its foreign policy 
objectives and to emphasize the importance of understanding that the Wagner Group is a 
multifaceted, global, and near-ubiquitous tool of Russian foreign policy.  
In Chapter III, I sketch the purpose and structure of my case studies that offer evidence 
indicating that the Wagner Group is a state actor prosecuting Russian foreign policy. The four 
cases are: The Ukrainian Intrastate Conflict; The Syrian Intrastate Conflict; Russian Power 
Projection in the Global South; and The Libyan Intrastate Conflict. The indicators that I have 
identified, demonstrating that the Wagner Group is a state actor, are: the Wagner Group’s 
presence; the Russian military’s presence; the number of Wagner casualties; the number of 
Russian military casualties; the Wagner Group’s lethality in the conflict; the degree of Wagner 
rent-seeking activity; the level of Kremlin support provided to the Wagner Group; the Kremlin’s 
diplomatic and strategic interests; the Kremlin’s economic interests; the degree of coordination 
between Wagner activities and Russian interests; the level of Russian state acknowledgement of 
the Wagner presence, and the Group’s overall level of success in the conflict. 
In Chapter IV, I present a case study of the Wagner Group’s involvement in the conflict 
in Ukraine where the Wagner Group had its debut on the world stage as a tool of Russian foreign 
policy and hybrid warfare. Additionally, it is one of the quintessential cases of Wagner activity, 
as it demonstrated the Wagner Group’s ability to operate both independently of and in tandem 
with official Russian military forces and demonstrated the full extent of the Group's plausible 
deniability as it engaged in military actions bordering on interstate conflict. Wagner’s close 
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coordination with Russian military and special forces, subordination to the Kremlin, and direct 
pursuit of Russian foreign policy interests in this conflict demonstrate that it is a state actor.  
In Chapter V, I detail the Wagner Group’s involvement in the conflict in Syria. This case 
serves as the Wagner Group's second and possibly most paradigmatic example of their 
operational capacity and the various roles they fill for Russian foreign policy. Syria served as a 
developmental period for the Wagner Group, and gave way to the "Syria model", which involves 
the exporting "of protection and support to authoritarian leaders in exchange for access to 
strategic assets and military bases".8 The Syria model has subsequently been used elsewhere 
consisting of close coordination between Wagner and Russian military force; deep ties between 
Wagner and Russian diplomatic, strategic, and economic interests in the country, and Wagner as 
a key actor in the Kremlin’s military strategy on the ground.  
In Chapter VI, I explore the involvement of the Wagner Group in the conflict in Libya. 
This case serves as a current and continuing example of Wagner activity in an intrastate conflict. 
The comparison of this case with the cases in Ukraine and Syria offers us a more complete 
illustration of Wagner's evolution from its inception to the present day. It is both similar to and 
different from past cases, and effectively demonstrates the direction in which Wagner will likely 
move in the future. This case demonstrates further the Wagner Group’s status as a Russian state 
actor, as it serves as the sole pursuant of the Russia’s interests in the Libyan conflict while 
receiving an unprecedented amount of support from the Kremlin.  
In Chapter VII, I discuss the Wagner Group's involvement in Russian power projection 
operations throughout the Global South. Oftentimes inserting themselves into conflict zones, the 
 
8 U.S. House, Armed Services 2020.  
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Wagner Group and its proxies have operated in the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Mozambique, Venezuela, Sudan, Madagascar, Burundi, Yemen, and possibly others. Since the 
Group's involvement in the Syrian intrastate conflict, Wagner’s power projection function has 
proliferated to the point where it is now equally important the Group's ability to pursue Russian 
state interests in intrastate conflicts. This conflict showcases the Wagner Group’s ability to 
pursue Russian state interests broadly, effectively, and independently in a manner similar to a 
state agency or branch of the military, further demonstrating that it is a state actor.  
In Chapter VIII, I present my conclusions and then provide a series of policy 
recommendations pertaining to how the international community, and specifically the West, can 
effectively combat the Wagner Group's activities worldwide. With the Wagner Group's presence 
and scope of operation appearing to proliferate in recent years, and without any indication that 
this trend will change, the West and international community will require practical yet innovative 
solutions to deal with this rapidly evolving tool of Russian foreign policy and hybrid warfare.  
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“Guys, you’re destined for war.” 
 
-Anonymous Wagner commander 
 
 
“You can’t get so carried away with secrecy: why  
torture yourself when the whole world knows.” 
 
-Marat Gabidullin on Wagner 
 
 As it has been shrouded in ambiguity since its creation, it is important for the U.S. 
government, the international community, and the academic community to identify exactly who 
and what is the Wagner Group. In the first part of this chapter, I provide a brief background on 
the Group’s history, introduce key individuals, and describe its various operational support 
structures. My goal is to shed light on the character and capabilities of the Group that are salient 
to each case analyzed in this thesis. In the second part of this chapter, I set out the criteria for 
what constitutes a state and a nonstate actor. I explain the utility of designating the Wagner 
Group as a state actor, the benefits such a label would bring that center on removing the cover of 
ambiguity that has helped this hybrid-PMC operate. I provide a brief literature review that 
sketches the debate about whether the Wagner Group is a state or a nonstate actor. I also briefly 
review policy responses to Wagner that treat it as either a state or a nonstate actor to depict the 
full range of ideas on how the Group should be labeled. 
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I. Who is the Wagner Group?  
 The Wagner Group emerged from the Slavonic Corps, a paramilitary outfit consisting of 
Cossacks and a second group of fighters led by Dmitry Utkin that was deployed to Syria by the 
Kremlin to pursue Russian interests through part of 2013.9 While in Syria, the Slavonic Corps 
splits into two separate detachments along the aforementioned dividing line.10 In 2014, both 
groups traveled to Ukraine, fulfilled different functions for the Kremlin, and further seperated 
from each other.11 While fighting in the Donbass, Utkin formed Группа Вагнера (Wagner’s 
Group), named after his own pseudonym.12  
 In Ukraine, the Wagner Group was most active from 2014 to 2016 with a reported small-
scale return to the country in 2018.13 In Syria, the Wagner Group was fighting for the Kremlin 
from 2015 until 2018, with the Deir al-Zour massacre and Putin’s official withdrawal of Russian 
forces from the country both contributing to the Group’s exit.14 Throughout the Global South, the 
Wagner Group has been engaging in power projection operations since about 2018.15 In Libya, 
 
9 Sukhankin 2019.  
 
10 Ibid.  
 




13 Gostev and Coalson 2016; Loanes 2019; SBU 2018; Жуковский 2017. The SBU stated in a 2018 report that 
nearly 100 Wagner fighters were likely to return to the country in the near future.  
 
14 Гуща 2018; Hauer 2019.  
 
15 Marten 2019; Sukhankin October 2018; Sukhankin November 2018; Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019. Marten 
discusses the CAR, Sukhankin Oct. discusses Yemen, Sukhankin Nov. discusses Burundi, and Tsvetkova and 
Zverev discuss Venezuela. 
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the earliest reports of Wagner fighters entering the country were made as early as 201816 and 
Wagner involvement in the Libyan conflict is ongoing.17  
 Two major individuals comprise the Wagner Group’s top leadership – Dmitry Utkin and 
Yevgeny Prigozhin. A man in his 50s with extensive experience commanding Russian Special 
Operations Forces (SPETSNAZ), eight years in prison, and a strong admiration for the Third 
Reich, Dmitry Utkin founded, and for a time, commanded the Wagner Group.18 Utkin’s 
experience is reflected in his hands-on approach in Ukraine, where he fought on the front-lines, 
promoting the Kremlin’s interests, and had a role in the murders of two Ukrainian commanders 
from local pro-Russian militias.19 While it is possible that he still commands the Wagner Group, 
Utkin has since been absorbed into Prigozhin’s corporate structure, assisting in the management 
of some of Prigozhin’s businesses in St. Petersburg as well.20 Utkin most definitely does not 
continue to travel alongside his fighters to combat zones.  
 Prigozhin (also known as Putin’s chef) comparatively serves as the chief financier of the 
Wagner Group and as its most direct link to both the Russian high military command and 
Vladimir Putin.21 A convicted criminal, it is overwhelmingly evident that Prigozhin has close 
 
16 Al Jazeera 2020; Nichols May 2020. 
 
17 Miller, Rya, Raghavan, and Mekhennet 2021.  
 
18 Бушуев и Барановская 2020; Gostev and Coalson 2016; Kara-Murza 2018; Лента.ru 2018; Жуковский 2017. 
From Kara-Murza: the name “Wagner” is derived from Utkin’s alias, which was inspired by his admiration for 
Hitler’s regime.  
 
19 Долгарева 2018; Marten 2019; СБУ 2018. In phone call audio published by the SBU (СБУ), Utkin is 
communicating with a Russian military official while in Ukraine with the sounds of the battle very clearly nearby. 
 
20 Лента.ru 2018.  
 
21 Бушуев и Барановская 2020; Marten 2019.  
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personal ties to Putin despite denials by both parties that any relationship exists.22 Despite some 
infighting between Prigozhin and the Russian high military command prior to 2018, he has 
become increasingly integral in the Kremlin’s pursuit of diplomatic/strategic and economic 
interests overseas.23 Prigozhin operates as the Russian Federation’s ‘Minister of Hybrid Warfare’ 
of sorts, holding a position of power over the Russian hybrid warfare initiative equal to that of 
the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.  
 Both of the aforementioned individuals have deep ties to the Russian state, and they are 
both state actors, not private citizens. Regarding Utkin, the Wagner commander held the official 
military title of Lt. Colonel of the Reserves while fighting with Slavonic Corps in Syria in 2013 
and during Wagner’s early years in Ukraine, also working for the GRU and SPETSNAZ earlier 
in his career.24 Additionally, leaked phone calls reveal Utkin’s more personal/less formal 
relationships with multiple high-ranking members of Russia’s military leadership.25 In 2016, 
Dmitry Utkin was also photographed at a high-profile reception at the Kremlin.26 This indicates 
Utkin’s post-Ukraine induction into the group of oligarchs and siloviki that constitutes the upper 
echelon of the Kremlin’s leadership in hybrid warfare.  
 Prigozhin’s deep ties to Vladimir Putin and the President’s inner circle are evident in the 
non-competitive and exclusive nature of the Russian market for PMCs. Such non-
 
22 Бушуев и Барановская 2020; Harding 2020; Marten 2019. Harding cites documents obtained by The Guardian 
that have suggested that Prigozhin’s activities are closely coordinated with those of Russian officials.   
 
23 Marten 2019; Sauer November 2019. Evgeny Prigozhin was present at high-profile peace talks among Russian 
officials and Khalifa Haftar, pertaining to the Libyan intrastate conflict.  
 
24 Бушуев и Барановская 2020; Reynolds 2019.  
 
25 СБУ January 2018; СБУ June 2018. The use of diminutives (Dima instead of Dmitry), slang, and vulgar language 
denotes at least a less-than-formal relationship. 
 
26 Gostev and Coalson 2016. Photographed by Korotkov, a high-profile investigative journalist at Fontanka.  
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competitiveness and exclusivity have resulted in Prigozhin being able to promote his own 
business interests while doing work for the Kremlin overseas.27 While promoting Russian 
interests in Sudan, Prigozhin also pursued business opportunities with two African mining 
companies.28 Additionally, no other Russian PMCs or paramilitary groups can compete with the 
Wagner Group in terms of its size and operational scope. One of Wagner’s counterparts, a better-
funded, global, and well-connected Russian PMC named Patriot also remains under Prigozhin’s 
influence, as he sits on the PMC’s board of trustees.29 Notably, Patriot fills in on duties that 
Wagner typically does not, rather than acting as a competitor.30 This leaves Wagner with near-
total control over the already tiny marketplace for PMCs in Russia and unfettered access to the 
Kremlin and its military contracts.  
 The Wagner Group is a hybrid-PMC, which means it is a private military company that is 
subordinate to the state and serves critical functions of government while retaining its 
designation as a private entity, consequently benefitting from this designation. In applying this 
label, I am building on the label of “Quasi-PMC” coined by Sergey Sukhankin, the leading 
scholar on the Wagner Group.31 The key consideration I stress that makes the Wagner Group a 
hybrid-PMCs is that it exhibits a similar sense of hybridity as a hybrid regime, such as Vladimir 
Putin’s. Whereas hybrid regimes attempt to masquerade as democracies, often going to great 
lengths to do so, they sit closer to the autocratic side of the spectrum; hybrid-PMCs attempt to 
 
27 Harding 2020; Marten 2019. 
 
28 Ibid.  
 
29 Hauer 2018; Peter 2019; Sukhankin August 2018. Patriot is more well-connected to Russian military officials than 
Wagner, specifically. 
 
30 Sukhankin November 2018. Patriot specializes in providing security to individuals. Wagner does not frequently 
engage in this activity.   
 
31 Sukhankin 2019 Autumn.   
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masquerade as nonstate actors in a similar way, yet they are state actors that fill a very specific 
set of strategically oriented roles within their respective host hybrid regimes.  
 Many factors contribute to the Wagner Group’s broad operational and geographical 
scope. First, the hybrid-PMC is well-equipped, touting a reserve of various types of tanks, 
heavily armored troop transports, jeeps armed with machineguns, access to artillery and air 
support, and specialized weaponry.32 Second, Wagner it permitted to use the ports at Sevastopol 
and Novorossiysk as well as the airfields/airports in Mozdok, Ryazan, Ivanova, and other cities 
where Russian airborne units are located.33 During the Ukrainian conflict, the Rostov Oblast’ 
served as the primary conduit for technical and material support to pro-Russian separatist groups, 
which continued into the Syrian conflict in which Wagner fighters would fly out of Rostov 
through a private air company and civilian airport.34  
 Third, the Wagner Group compensates its fighters well and provides them with relatively 
high-quality training, attracting talent and experience. Originally, Slavonic Corps fighters 
received monthly salaries of $5,000 with a $20,000 compensation for serious wounds and a 
$40,000 compensation to the families of fighters killed in action.35 In Ukraine, Wagner fighters 
received monthly salaries of $2,500, and in the case of a fighter’s death, their family were to 
receive a payment somewhere between $41,100 and $68,500.36 In Syria, monthly salaries in 
 
32 DFRLab 2018; Integral 2018; Долгарева 2018; Euromaidan Press 2018. 
 
33 Sukhankin December 2019. Moscow was also used by Wagner to a lesser degree. This data was in reference to 
the transport of Wagner fighters to Syria, specifically.  
 
34 Ibid.  
 
35 Ibid.  
 
36 Долгарева 2018; Sukhankin December 2019. For the payment to the family, Долгарева cites between 3 and 5 
million rubles, which at 2015 rates translates to between ~41,097 USD and ~68468 USD.  
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2015-2016 ranged from $3,800 to $5,300 based on rank, then spiked to as high as $8,000 in 2017 
due to an increase in hostilities, and dropped to $2,200-$3,300 after the Syrian government 
received primary responsibility from the Kremlin for compensating the Group.37 Another report 
from a former member of the Wagner Group suggests that fighters’ starting salaries were lower 
but they were awarded a commission for successful operations, that consisted of 30%-100% of 
each fighter’s salary.38 If a fighter died in Syria, a payment ranging from $46,000-$80,000 was to 
be provided to the fighter’s family similar to during the Group’s involvement in Ukraine.39 For 
training, Wagner fighters attend the PMC’s facility in Mol’kino, which sits across from a GRU 
facility, and are taught how to use various forms of special weaponry, conduct advanced forms 
of Electronic Warfare, coordinate land and air operations, engage in partisan style subversive 
activities, and recruit foreign assets.40 This develops Wagner fighters into useful tools of hybrid 
warfare, as their training covers the skills necessary to promote nearly all arms of Russian hybrid 
warfare doctrine.  
 When recruiting its fighters, the Wagner Group targets a few key demographics. Most 
notably, it has been reported to specifically recruit individuals with strong Slavic ethnonationalist 
beliefs or financial troubles, especially those with previous military service.41 Wagner has 
additionally recruited fighters from the combat zones in which it is engaged. In Ukraine, the 
Group made efforts to recruit like-minded Ukrainians and created an all-Ukrainian detachment 
 
37 Peter 2018; Sukhankin December 2019. From Peter: officers received 5300 USD, whereas Sukhankin cites 3800 
USD for average fighters.  
 
38 Sukhankin December 2019.  
 
39 Ibid.  
 
40 Долгарева 2018; Marten 2019; Sukhankin December 2019. The special weaponry includes multiple rocket 
launchers and self-propelled guns.  
 
41 Украинская Правда 2018; Vasilyeva 2017.  
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that fought for Wagner in Syria.42 Wagner has repeated this strategy in other conflicts, recruiting 
Syrians and Sub-Saharan Africans to fight in Libya.43 This is a strategy shared by Russian 
SPETSNAZ,44 and Wagner’s implementation of this type of recruitment reflects the significant 
degree of collective experience in Russian SPETSNAZ among the Group’s leadership and 
fighters.  
 One of the Wagner Group’s defining characteristics is the degree of secrecy with which it 
operates, and Utkin’s hybrid-PMC has proven that it is willing and capable of going to great 
lengths to prevent its activities from being made public. For example, while investigating the 
Group in the CAR in 2018, three Russian journalists under the employ of Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
were assassinated by Wagner fighters.45 In April 2018, Maxim Borodin died mysteriously after 
falling from a balcony in Yekaterinburg while investigating the Wagner Group.46 Denis 
Korotkov, one of the leading investigative journalists working on the Wagner Group, was forced 
into hiding due to receiving such a high number of death threats in response to his work.47 These 
tactics are typical of the agencies involved in Russian hybrid warfare, the siloviki in general, and 
Vladimir Putin’s brand of foreign policy.  
 
 
42 Украинская Правда 2018; Жуковский 2017. The all-Ukrainian detachment has gone by the names of Karpati 
(Карпаты) and Vesnya (Весна).  
 
43 Al Jazeera June 2020; Miller et al 2021; Reuters Staff 2020.  
 
44 United States Government 2015.  
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assassinations, as a car carrying two Central Africans and three armed white men passed by the attack site shortly 
prior, according to local eyewitness accounts.  
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II. Labeling the Wagner Group: How and Why?  
 There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the activities of the Wagner Group 
worldwide. This ambiguity is an asset for the Kremlin and others who hire the Wagner Group. 
Wagner’s ambiguity is what gives it power, makes it an effective tool of hybrid warfare, and 
allows it to persistently pursue the Kremlin’s diplomatic, strategic, and economic interests 
worldwide with a notably low degree of blowback (whether domestic or foreign). Dispelling that 
ambiguity and depriving the Wagner Group and the Kremlin of the aforementioned benefits is 
within the interests of the U.S. and its allies, carrying with it great benefits for Western security 
and foreign policy.  
 Within the context of intrastate conflicts, a state actor is any individual or group that is 
actively pursuing the interests of a state involved in the conflict. These actors are a part of the 
state that they represent, and each one must satisfy one or more of their state’s functions. A state 
actor carries with it the full diplomatic backing and reputation of their state, and their state is 
typically held accountable for the actor’s actions. For example, state actors that were involved in 
the Syrian intrastate conflict included: Russia, the Syrian military, French diplomats, and the 
President of the United States. Whether it is the entire federal government or just one individual, 
they are a state actor so long as they meet the aforementioned criteria.  
 Conversely, nonstate actors are those who do not represent a state in the aforementioned 
ways. Additional criteria for nonstate actors include: the absence of formal power over or on 
behalf of a given population, the absence of a constituency, and the absence of formally 
controlled territory.48 Examples of nonstate actors are NGOs, political parties and lobbying 
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groups, media entities, oligarchs, international criminal organizations, diasporas and ethnic 
organizations, and terrorist groups.49 Nonstate actors, while separate from any given state, can 
act as official representatives of groups within a country and can often carry with themselves a 
significant degree of influence.50 Within the context of intrastate conflicts, a nonstate actor is any 
individual or group that has no ties to a state, pursues its own set of interests with in the conflict, 
only represents itself, and is only accountable to itself. Examples of nonstate actors in the Syrian 
intrastate conflict were ISIS, the Kurdish organizations involved in the conflict, and the United 
Nations (U.N.). While some of these actors have relationships with states, none of them are 
states themselves, representatives of states, or official state organs.  
 Within the academic literature on the Wagner Group, authors appear to avoid directly 
labeling the hybrid-PMC as either a state or nonstate actor. Milevski greatly insinuates that the 
Group is a state actor, citing its especially close ties with the Russian state structure, its exclusive 
provision of services to Russia or Russian oligarchs tied to the state.51 Additionally, he argues 
that Wagner’s close integration with the GRU and receipt of military equipment, vehicles, 
support, and medical services from the Russian state makes it a state actor.52 Milevski further 
argues that the close integration of the Wagner Group into the Russian military’s command and 
control structure in Syria demonstrates that it is a state actor.53 Kimberly Marten, one of the 
leading scholars on the Wagner Group also insinuates that the hybrid-PMC is a state actor 
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without designating it as one.54 She describes the Group’s relationship with the Russian state as 
hard to define and places additional emphasis on its illegality.55 However, she then goes on to 
argue that Wagner’s plausible deniability has fully eroded, that it works on behalf of rational 
Russian state interests, and that it at times incurs risks for the Russian state.56 Marten stops short 
of calling the Wagner Group a state actor, instead designating it a “semi-state informal security 
organization”;57 however, her discussion of the group insinuates that this designation lies far 
closer to that of a state actor than that of a nonstate actor. 
 Certain policy responses to the Wagner Group have suggested that it is a state actor. One 
example involves one of the United States’ policy responses to the Group’s role in the Ukrainian 
conflict.58 In a 2017 reinforcement of sanctions on actors that had backed the pro-Russia 
separatists in the conflict, the U.S. sanctioned the Wagner Group, Dmitry Utkin, and two of 
Prigozhin’s companies alongside Russian government officials.59 With U.S. policy on the 
Ukrainian conflict having designated Russia as the conflict’s primary aggressor, the inclusion of 
the aforementioned Wagner-related actors insinuates that the U.S. views them as part of the 
Russian state. A similar example involves U.S. actions in the Syrian conflict, specifically leading 
up to the Deir al-Zour massacre. Leading up to, during, and after the massacre, the U.S. utilized 
the deconfliction line to directly speak with Russian military commanders, receiving nothing 
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other than denial of involvement from the Russian officials.60 While the U.S. ultimately killed 
the Wagner fighters who had encroached on the American-held position, their decision to contact 
the Russian state beforehand insinuates that the U.S. views the Kremlin as the ultimate authority 
over the Wagner fighters. 
 Conversely, while discussing the Wagner Group, Sukhankin often calls it a nonstate actor 
but with the addition of small caveats, stopping short of fully labeling it as one.61 Sukhankin 
acknowledges Wagner’s ever-growing importance in the pursuit of Russian foreign policy; 
however, he discusses the Group as an asset rather than a functionary of the Russian regime.62 
He illustrates the Group as a service-provider, exporting the Syria model across the Global 
South, rather than an entity aimed towards filling core functions of Russian foreign policy and 
pursuing the Kremlin’s interests abroad.63 Briefly, Sukhankin does acknowledge some aspects of 
the Group’s characterization that suggest it is possibly state-sponsored, but does not insinuate 
that state-sponsorship indicates that the Wagner Group is a state actor.64 
 Some policy responses to the Wagner Group indicated that multiple states/leaders view 
the hybrid-PMC as a nonstate actor, although official declarations have yet to be made. 
Pertaining to the Wagner Group’s involvement in the Libyan conflict, in 2019 President Erdogan 
of Turkey publicly denoted the Group as Haftar’s mercenaries in Libya, adding the caveat that it 
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is also evident who is actually paying them.65 Erdogan’s comments reflected Sukhankin’s 
position that while Wagner is state supported, it remains a separate entity that is simply 
providing a service. Turkey’s actions against the Wagner Group in Libya backed up its position. 
Turkey’s counteroffensive against the pro-Haftar coalition, of which Wagner constitutes a 
significant portion, treated the Wagner fighters and Haftar’s insurgents exactly the same.66 
Turkey’s offensive treated the Wagner Group as a nonstate actor, specifically as an insurgent 
group.  
 In both the academic literature and in the policy community, there is not a consensus 
about whether the Wagner Group should be labeled as a state or a nonstate actor. The absence of 
a consensus flows from uncertainty in the academic community and among policymakers about 
how to best respond to the Wagner Group as much as from a disagreement about the true 
character of the Group. As is often the case when a domestic or geopolitical norm is violated, it 
can be difficult to gain a complete understanding of what is the most effective and appropriate 
response. Broader ideas on this topic exist within the academic and policy literature on Wagner, 
but ambiguity reigns supreme, nonetheless. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by 
serving as the critical first step towards eliminating Wagner’s shield of ambiguity, opening the 
door to establishing new norms pertaining to hybrid-PMCs, and crafting policy responses to their 
illicit activities. 
 So long as the Wagner Group continues to greatly benefit from its ambiguity, it retains 
many of the advantages allotted to nonstate actors while also benefitting from the full backing of 
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the Russian state. This ambiguity permits the Wagner Group to act as an effective tool of 
Russian foreign policy, as it navigates the landscape of an increasingly multipolar world while 
also avoiding many of the roadblocks that opportunistic and ideologically illiberal states like 
Russia face when they attempt to aggressively pursue their interests abroad. While in this paper I 
argue that the Wagner Group is a state actor, a clear and definitive label of the Group as either a 
state or nonstate actor is critical to curtailing Wagner’s ability to promote Russian interests 
overseas in the seemingly nearly comprehensive way that it does. To truly combat the Wagner 
Group, whether in policy or in academic discourse, the necessary first step is to dispel the 
ambiguity which gives it power and allows the Kremlin to continue to benefit with near-zero 
repercussions. With an absence of such a label, this thesis aims to serve as that crucial first step.  
 I draw on four case studies of Wagner activity in this thesis, demonstrating that the 
Wagner Group is a Russian state actor. In Chapter III, I outline the indicators that I examine in 
each case study. These indicators investigate the interactions between Russian interests, policies, 
and activities and the Wagner Group’s operations, actions, and functions in each conflict and 
shed light on the nature of the relationship between the two aforementioned parties, proving that 
the Wagner Group is a state actor. Prior to this, however, I provide in Chapter II a discussion of 
the role of the Wagner Group in Russian foreign policy. This chapter demonstrates that the 
Wagner Group is a tool of contemporary Russian foreign policy and provides important context 
pertaining to the functions Wagner serves within the broader scope of the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy and grand strategy.  
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"The 1980s are now calling to ask for their 
foreign policy back." 
 
–President Barack Obama 
 
 
“Putin’s goal isn’t to defeat a candidate or 
party. He means to defeat the West.” 
 
-Senator John McCain 
 
  Prior to the annexation of Crimea and war in Ukraine, Russia’s resurgence was often 
overlooked. Even among experienced policymakers, like U.S. President Barack Obama who 
mocked Mitt Romney for once describing the Russian Federation as the United States’ 
preeminent threat to national security, the scope and potential of the Kremlin’s increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy strategy was underestimated. Today, the Kremlin is involved in a 
nearly comprehensive set of activities outside of its own borders and utilizes a variety of tools in 
pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The Wagner Group is one such tool of contemporary 
Russian foreign policy, because it pursues the three central goals outlined in the Kremlin’s 
official doctrine – great power politics, external economic investment, and autocracy promotion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the Wagner Group fits into the goals and 
methods of Russian foreign policy.  
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 In this chapter, when referring to contemporary Russian foreign policy, I mean the 
policies outlined in the most recent variants of official doctrine published by the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which includes the 2016 foreign policy concept and 2019 official 
reflection on Russian foreign policy. When discussing Russian foreign policy, I regard the 
contemporary period as beginning in 2013-2014 with the Russian incursion into Eastern Ukraine 
and annexation of Crimea and continuing to the present day.  
 Based on actions abroad and published statements, I identify three central objectives that 
animate Russia’s foreign policy. Most critically, the Kremlin is fueled by a desire to attain and 
maintain what it believes is ‘great power’ status in an increasingly multipolar world. Second, the 
Kremlin aims to bolster its economy via external investment and rent-seeking, especially in 
political unstable areas or intrastate conflicts. Third, the Kremlin aims to counter what it believes 
is a U.S. and Brussels-led Western hegemonic coalition by developing its own coalition of 
illiberal and autocratic states, largely by the means of autocracy promotion. The 2016 Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the 2019 Main Foreign Policy Results from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation serve as the two most recently 
published summaries of Russia’s foreign policy positions and objectives. I draw from these 
documents along with scholarship on contemporary Russian foreign policy. While there may 
exist other Russian foreign policy objectives, I have identified these three as the most important 
and salient to the study of the Wagner Group.    
 The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. In section one, I discuss the role of 
attaining and maintaining great power status in Russian foreign policy. In section two, I discuss 
the role of external economic investment in Russian foreign policy. In section three, I discuss the 
role of autocracy promotion in Russian foreign policy and the Kremlin’s attempts to counter the 
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West by building a coalition of illiberal and autocratic states. In section four, I argue that the 
Wagner Group is a tool of Russian foreign policy and discuss how it fits into the Kremlin’s three 
central foreign policy goals.  
 
I. The Role of Great Power Status in Russian Foreign Policy 
 Great power status and great power geopolitics play a central role in Russia’s foreign 
policy. In Russian foreign policy doctrine, there are two areas in which the Kremlin is concerned 
with great power politics – maintaining its footholds in areas where it currently acts as a great 
power and attaining great power status in areas where it has less influence.67 Russian great power 
posturing involves both longstanding areas, such as its seat on the U.N. Security Council and 
over the Russian diaspora abroad, and emerging areas, such as in proxy wars like those in Syria 
and Libya.68 Derived from its belief that a multipolar geopolitical environment is currently 
emerging, the Kremlin understands great power status as that which allows a state to “be a 
central player in an increasingly fluid international order”.69 For the Kremlin, this status provides 
it with legitimacy to unilaterally pursue its interests abroad, interfere in the domestic affairs of 
other states, extend its sovereignty beyond its territorial bounds, and shape the direction of an 
evolving international arena.  
Russian policymakers are aware of the benefits great power status holds and outline the 
means by which they aim to attain and maintain such status in their foreign policy doctrine. In 
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effect since 2016, the Russia’s foreign policy concept lists the consolidation of great power 
status as its third priority.70 This preceded only by the defense of Russian national security and 
bolstering the Russian economy.71 Russian foreign policy doctrine also states that the Kremlin 
still views its seat on the U.N. Security Council and its influence over the ‘near-abroad’ as the 
keystone of its percieved great power status.72 However, Russia has not been shy in its efforts to 
expand its influence and great power status well beyond its traditional scope. Since 2016, it has 
attempted to attain more widespread recognition as a great power by engaging in military 
interventions abroad, holding influential roles in conflict resolution discussions alongside other 
salient state actors, and committing forces to combatting insurgencies or terrorist groups that 
plague its allies.73  
Great power status is a longstanding goal of Russian (and formerly Soviet) foreign policy 
and remains salient due to multiple historical and current factors. Three key historical factors 
affect Russian policymakers’ current drive to attain and maintain great power status. First, 
Russia has experienced a long history of invasion due to its lack of natural defensive barriers 
against hostile neighbors; its foreign policy is consequently driven by a feeling of insecurity.74 In 
addition to insecurity, Russia’s lack of geographic bounds has also incentivized uninhibited 
border expansion.75 Throughout its history, expansion has served as a strategy by which the 
current Russian state and its predecessors (Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union) have 
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attained/maintained great power status,76 and in turn its great power status provides legitimacy 
for its expansion efforts.77  
Second, the legacy of the Soviet Union (USSR) has a prominent impact on the way many 
Russian citizens and policymakers view themselves. While Russia was once just one part of the 
USSR, its sense of Soviet legacy is oftentimes stronger than in other parts of the post-Communist 
bloc. This is largely due to Russia’s designation as the official successor to the Soviet Union and 
its subsequent inheritance of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, its seat on the U.N. Security 
Council, and many of the USSR’s institutions, including its intelligence services.78  
Third, the Russian leadership’s decision to seek great power status was codified in the 
1996 Primakov Doctrine.79 Initiated by Yevgeny Primakov, a former foreign and Russian prime 
minister, this doctrine summarily rejects the acceptance of U.S. hegemony.80 Specifically, it aims 
to counter the liberal democratic order by the means of organizing a coalition of major 
powers/poles that collectively serve as an effective opponent to the U.S. Furthermore, the 
Doctrine argues for the importance of greater Russian regional hegemony in the post-Soviet 
space.81  
These three factors remain relevant to Russian foreign policy, and the Kremlin’s focus in 
these three areas has shifted in accordance with modern challenges. In terms of expansion to 
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promote great power status, the Kremlin tends to favor soft power over hard power. For instance, 
the development of economic and political influence abroad and strength at home oftentimes 
serve as more impactful forms of expansion than physical expansion itself.82 The post-Soviet 
expansion of actors which the Kremlin views as threats or competitors into its near-abroad, such 
as NATO and the E.U., has prompted the belief that Russian sovereignty can only be preserved 
by great power status. As a result, the Kremlin continues to engage in great power posturing 
abroad, mainly through the use of soft power, hybrid warfare campaigns, military interventions, 
and other similar tactics. While it is unlikely that either NATO or an E.U. member-state is 
planning an invasion of sovereign soil, Russian concerns regarding expansion pertain more so to 
the ability of these actors to influence domestic Russian affairs and Russian regional hegemony 
(whether real or perceived).  
Russia’s foreign policy has been greatly impacted by the country’s Soviet legacy. 
Consequently, it is often viewed as a continuation of Soviet and Imperial Russian foreign 
policy.83 Consequently, Russian activities abroad frequently resemble that of a great power,84 
despite it not being a geopolitical equal to the United States, China, or the European Union. 
Considering that Russia, as the successor to the USSR, lost approximately two million square 
miles of what was formerly its sovereign territory,85 it is likely that Kremlin officials feel 
insecure in the country’s great power status. This territorial loss coupled with the expansion of 
Western influence over former Soviet territory may contribute to Russia’s ongoing attempts to 
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garner influence in critical regions outside its periphery, such as the Middle East, North Africa, 
Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The Primakov Doctrine remains especially relevant for Russian foreign policy, especially 
as the foundation upon which the Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian hybrid war are built.86 It 
explains the importance of contesting U.S. interests to Russian foreign policy and promotes the 
Kremlin’s push for a more multipolar world.87 In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov published an 
article in a Russian military journal which outlined what he viewed as the new “rules of war” and 
the direction Russian military policy must take to stay ahead in the coming decades.88 Now 
known as the Gerasimov Doctrine, this article is accredited as the blueprint for contemporary 
Russian hybrid warfare.  
Hybrid warfare consists of a combined use of soft and hard power that aims to 
circumvent international laws, norms, and institutions in order to pursue strategic interests 
abroad. It is just as much a tool of foreign policy as it is of military policy. Moreover, its serves 
as a strategic blueprint for meeting the objectives of the Primakov Doctrine. One central 
objective of the Russian hybrid warfare campaign is to destabilize and disrupt the activities of its 
competitors abroad, such as the U.S., E.U., and other liberal democratic states. This directly 
serves the Primakov Doctrine, as it aims to pull the U.S. and other Western powers down to 
Russia’s level.  
Of the three Russian foreign policy goals discussed in this section, great power status is 
the most important. It is vital to not confuse Russia’s preoccupation with great power status as 
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just a desire to pursue its interests abroad in a staunchly realist or neo-imperial manner. As I 
explain above, a more nuanced web of objectives, fears, and perceptions fuel the Kremlin’s 
pursuit of great power status. However, it is also important to understand that while Russia 
resembles a great power in many ways, it has a long way to go before it reaches such a point. 
Even in periods when Russia was considered a great power, it was weak in comparison with 
concurrent great powers.89 Today, Russia is more equal to regional powers such as Turkey rather 
than global powers such as the U.S. or China. However, the aforementioned reasons why Russia 
aims to attain and maintain great power status suggest that the mere perception of Russia as a 
great power may be sufficient in meeting the Kremlin’s goal.  
 
II. The Role of External Economic Investment in Russian Foreign Policy 
 External economic investment has become increasingly central to Russian foreign policy. 
This is directly evident in the Kremlin’s most recent Foreign Policy Concept. In 2016, it served 
as the second strategic national priority of Russian foreign policy, stating that it must aim “to 
create a favorable external environment that would allow Russia’s economy to grow steadily and 
become more competitive”.90 The Kremlin engages in a wide variety of economic activities 
abroad, but two are especially relevant to the Wagner Group’s role in Russian foreign policy: 
development projects and rent-seeking. First, Russia’s foreign policy doctrine emphasizes 
development projects, especially in states overlooked by Western actors. It appears that such 
investment typically serves both economic and political purposes. Second, Russia’s foreign 
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policy emphasizes the importance of rent-seeking operations abroad, both maintaining current 
sources of rent and investing in new ones. It is also important to note that both a focus on 
integration and cooperation with states in Russia’s near-abroad and economic agreements with 
the European Union remain critical areas of interest to the Kremlin.91 When using the term ‘rent-
seeking’ in this thesis, I am referring to the strategic capture of resources or ‘rents’ in a state 
outside of Russia’s territorial bounds. This can include the capture of resources through deals 
with local governments or elites as well as military intervention and other forms of hard power.  
Russian foreign policy doctrine outlines a few key regions in which the Kremlin is 
especially interested in pursuing external economic investment. First, there is a clear focus on the 
Middle East, North Africa, and the Southern Mediterranean region. This especially pertains to oil 
and the stability of the global oil market. Second, there is an additional focus on Latin America 
and the Caribbean. This especially pertains to investment geared at integrating Latin American 
and Caribbean states into the global market and competing with the U.S. for influence in the 
region.92 Third and most significant is the doctrine’s focus on Africa. A wide variety of Russian 
investment efforts are underway across the continent, including economic coalition building, 
extensive rent-seeking, expansion of trade with African states, and Russian public and private 
investment in contracted projects across Africa.93   
 Current Russian development efforts are largely a response to domestic economic turmoil 
incited by sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of 
Eastern Ukraine. The consequential isolation from global markets and Russia’s status as a rentier 
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state led the Kremlin to seek out alternative areas of economic growth and rents, inciting the 
current wave of development efforts across the Global South.94 Russian development projects 
abroad aim to compete with the West’s by offering opportunities for economic growth without 
the liberal democratic requirements that are often included in Western contracts, specifically 
those pertaining to human rights.95 A policy of non-interference in domestic political affairs sits 
at the core of Russian development projects abroad.96  
 One important example of Russian development abroad is the recent inaugural Russia-
Africa economic forum that took place in Sochi in October 2019, which involved 43 African 
states and outlined plans for greater integration between the Russian and various African 
economies.97 This forum intended to coordinate Russian-African cooperation on an 
unprecedented scale, including the doubling of trade between Russia and African states to $40 
billion in three to four years and a stark intensification of Russian business investment in the 
African consumer market. Additionally, the Kremlin and the African states involved in the Sochi 
forum emphasized their collective desire to maintain “principles of independence and non-
interference” when dealing in matters of international economic cooperation.98  
 The African states participating in the 2019 Russia-Africa economic forum also came 
prepared with ambitious deals that they extended to the Kremlin. For example, the Ethiopian 
representatives proposed plans to coordinate with Russia on the development of atomic power 
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plants in Ethiopia. Engaging in such costly and ambitious projects remains in the Kremlin’s 
interest, as the summit also aims to develop stronger political ties across the African continent. 
Additionally, the Russian government hopes closer cooperation with African states will allow it 
to serve as a key leader across the African continent, holding a prominent role in issues such as 
intrastate conflicts, outbreaks of disease, and natural disasters. It is important to note that while 
43 African states met in Sochi, only 11 sent high-ranking delegates such as a vice president or 
foreign minister.99 While the summit served both political and economic objectives, the absence 
of heads of state indicates that it remains primarily a tool of external economic investment rather 
than one of great power politics.  
 The Kremlin has two goals pertaining to rent seeking abroad: maintaining the integrity of 
longstanding sources of rents and investing in new ones. One salient example of a longstanding 
source of rent for the Russian government is the exportation of oil and gas to Ukraine as well as 
to the rest of Europe through Ukraine. Leading up to the 2014 Russian invasion of Eastern 
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, oil and gas exports from Russia to Ukraine dropped by nearly 
half, and in 2014 Russia witnessed a declination in its total exports of crude oil by 5.6%.100 
Previously, Gazprom had supplied over half of Ukraine’s natural gas, and positive relations 
between the two countries have led to an increased reliance on Russian oil and gas as well as 
discounts for Ukraine.101 The aforementioned declination in Ukrainian dependence on Russian 
oil and gas coupled with a stark decrease in 2014 oil prices generated a strong economic interest 
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in instituting a pro-Russia regime in Ukraine, as energy exports to the near-abroad constitute a 
significant portion of the Russian economy.102  
 In addition to serving as a critical source of revenue for the Russian energy industry, 
Ukraine serves as a corridor for exporting oil and gas to the rest of Europe. Keeping Ukraine in 
its sphere of influence provides the Kremlin with access to this corridor and a significant portion 
of its revenue from energy exports. As of 2014, Gazprom was providing Europe with 
approximately 30% of its gas each year, and it appeared that the European demand for Russian 
oil and gas was on the rise.103 Additionally, a larger portion of Russia’s energy exports actually 
go to states outside of its near-abroad. In 2014, nearly 95% of total crude oil revenue was derived 
from exports to non-Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, totally $145.6 
billion.104 Therefore, it is critical that the Kremlin maintains influence over Ukraine so as to 
ensure its access to the European energy market remains unfettered.  
 Recent Russian rent-seeking in Venezuela helps shed light on Russia’s ongoing 
investments abroad. Largely conducted through the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft, 
the Kremlin has acquired substantial access to and ownership of Venezuelan oil.105 In fact, 
Russia has gained ownership of large parts of five or more Venezuelan oil fields and two natural-
gas fields in the Caribbean. The Venezuelan government has even handed nearly half of Citgo to 
Rosneft as collateral on a Russian loan.106 Cooperation between the Russian and Venezuelan oil 
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industries has expanded dramatically, as Venezuela’s state-owned oil company has established a 
substantial presence in Moscow and Putin’s regime has a seemingly-permanent corporate and 
military presence in Venezuela.107 The Kremlin is pursuing similar investments in energy and 
natural resources in South America, the Middle East, and Africa.   
 Russian external economic investment promotes both the Kremlin’s economic and 
political objectives, as it accrues capital and rents while bolstering the state’s influence abroad. It 
is a central goal of Russian foreign policy, as it appears to be present in all Russian activities 
abroad, whether as a central or underlying objective. Despite challenges posed by the West, 
external economic investment continues to be a successful means of bolstering the Russian 
economy and promoting Russian foreign policy objectives. 
 
III. The Role of Autocracy Promotion in Russian Foreign Policy  
 The ongoing Russian attempt to build an anti-U.S./Brussels autocratic bloc by the means 
of autocracy promotion serves as the third central goal of Russian foreign policy. In Russian 
foreign policy doctrine, autocracy promotion holds a place of importance second only to great 
power politics and external economic investment, and three of the doctrine’s “main objectives” 
pertain to it. Specifically, the 2016 foreign policy concept discusses the promotion of “mutually 
beneficial and equal partnerships with foreign countries […] guided by the principles of 
independence and sovereignty”, the Russian perspective regarding international processes, and 
the facilitation of constructive dialog that is mutually beneficial to all parties.108 This 
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demonstrates that the Putin regime aims to build a coalition rooted in the principles of 
multipolarity and non-interference.109 Essentially, the Kremlin aims to direct the course of 
modern geopolitics toward the reemergence of a multipolar world order largely directed by self-
interested autocratic or hybrid regimes. One necessary step, however, is the development of 
friendly and like-minded regimes abroad that share a similar disgruntlement with the liberal-
democratic order. For example, Russia has found one such friend in Venezuela, as Maduro 
recently described Russia as its comrade “in a fight against American hegemony and leading the 
charge toward a new, multipolar world”.110 
 Russian autocracy promotion aims to create this coalition of illiberal and autocratic states 
by targeting three key areas. First, Russia desires to expand its kleptocratic networks outward, 
linking the kleptocracy to allied autocratic and hybrid regimes abroad. The Kleptocracy stems 
from the murky public-private relationship in Russia and serves as an effective conduit for 
autocracy promotion. The Russian kleptocracy consists of a network of ex-KGB strongmen 
known as siloviki that seized a significant portion of control over the Russian economy during 
the transition from the Soviet Union to present-day Russia. These individuals were deeply 
embedded in the Russian state, which provided the Kremlin with a near-comprehensive scope of 
control over the Russian economy, ultimately “[nationalizing] the risk and [privatizing] the 
reward”.111  
The Russian kleptocracy has evolved to become international in scope. For example, 
Russian siloviki utilize American and British banks to store and launder their money, the 
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Kremlin utilizes the kleptocracy’s economic might to capture foreign businesses and sway 
foreign elites, and both the siloviki and Kremlin exploit sources of corruption in the near-abroad 
to assert Russian dominance in the region. However, the kleptocracy’s reliance on Western 
banks and markets when hiding its capital has made it especially vulnerable to economic 
sanctions.112 Consequently, the development of a Kremlin-led illiberal bloc is both in Russia’s 
political and economic interests, as it attempts to distance itself from the vulnerabilities tied to a 
reliance upon the West. Liaison with foreign elites is an especially salient aspect of Russian 
kleptocratic expansion abroad, as it generates an underlying network that can advance Russian 
foreign policy interests globally with less attention from the international community and a high 
degree of plausible deniability. When the Kremlin promotes its version of autocracy (a hybrid, 
leaning-autocratic regime with a close integration between the public and private sectors) abroad, 
the establishment of kleptocratic networks integrated into Russia’s kleptocracy aids in creating a 
Russo-centric coalition.  
Second, Russian autocracy promotion is furthered by frequent attempts to weaken 
democratic institutions and erode trust in democratic governments abroad. The Kremlin viewed 
the Arab Spring and Color Revolutions as U.S. sponsored or orchestrated events, and the Maidan 
protests in Ukraine escalated fears in the Kremlin that a similar event could take place in Russia 
and usurp the incumbent regime. This served as the catalyst for Russia’s entrance into regime 
competition and fixation on eroding democracy abroad.113 Moreover, Russian policymakers 
strongly believe that democratic processes are less likely to produce governments that align with 
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their interests, further justifying the push to promote the Russian autocratic model and engage in 
anti-democratic activities abroad.114 
From an analysis of the literature on Russian autocracy promotion, one camp posits that 
Russian anti-democratic activities abroad are strategically motivated rather than ideologically 
motivated.115 I also take this position with the caveat that ideology is a major consideration in 
Russian autocracy promotion and coalition building because it is in Russia’s strategic interest to 
undermine liberal democratic states and institutions. Specifically, Russia focuses on promoting 
its autocratic model among states that support Russian economic and geopolitical interests, rather 
than picking states exclusively on the basis of political ideology.116 As previously mentioned, the 
focus on promoting autocracy partially stems from the belief among Russian policymakers that 
democratic states are less likely to align with the Kremlin. It is also important to consider that 
Russia’s own Ethnopopulism and preferences for illiberal democracy and autocracy play 
additional roles in its decision to promote autocracy abroad. Yet overall, the focus stems from a 
percieved need to counter Western democracy promotion efforts, which the Russian regime 
views as a security threat, especially post-Maidan.117  
Third, the Kremlin promotes ethnopopulist messages and supports ethnopopulist parties 
as part of its global campaign of autocracy promotion. Ethnopopulism has been used as a 
strategy to win votes and take control of governments, often leading to severe democratic 
backsliding or regime change. It promotes Ethnopopulist messages, which fixate on the idea that 
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one particular ethnic, religious, or other identity-based group holds a claim to the title of ‘the 
people’ and is quick to identify enemies of the people, oftentimes spreading disinformation and 
propaganda to promote and legitimize these ideas.118 Russia views itself as a defender of what it 
considers conservative values,119 such as the preservation of Orthodox Christianity, anti-
immigrant sentiments, and male-dominated politics. These are not conservative values but rather 
Ethnopopulist values, and the Putin regime has come to acclaim as one of the preeminent 
promoters of Ethnopopulism abroad and even as a leader in the global ethnopopulist movement. 
Prior to the emergence of this movement, the Russian state fervently promoted its own message 
of “Great Russian Nationalism”, especially in the near-abroad. Previously, this message likely 
hindered the Kremlin’s ability to promote autocracy outside of post-Soviet space.120 However, in 
light of the global proliferation of Ethnopopulism and its compatibility with Great Russian 
Nationalism, the opposite of Way’s argument appears to be the case, as the Russian state finds 
likeminded regimes, leaders, and groups outside of its near-abroad, such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, 
Le Pen in France, and Trump in the U.S.  
 
IV. The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Foreign Policy 
Russia continues to seek great power status, bolster the Russian economy while 
simoultaneously garnering political influence abroad through external economic investment, and 
establish an autocratic coalition to rival the U.S. and E.U. by the means of expanding 
kleptocratic networks, eroding trust in democracy, and promoting Ethnopopulism abroad. 
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Currently engaged in activities pertaining to each of these three central goals, the Wagner Group 
serves as a salient and effective tool of Russian foreign policy. Wagner’s global scope of 
operations and eclectic nature has led the Kremlin to increasingly rely on the hybrid-PMC when 
pursuing its foreign policy interests.  
The Wagner Group has been pivotal in the Putin regime’s efforts to attain further great 
power status. In the Libyan conflict, a vast array of state actors is currently engaging in an 
exercise in great power politics. Representing the Russian state, the Wagner Group has been 
instrumental in bolstering the rebellion led by Khalifa Haftar.121 The Kremlin has provided 
extensive support and supplies to the Group, and the Group has been used by the Kremlin to gain 
a foothold in Libya, according to the AFRICOM deputy director of intelligence.122 Wagner’s 
prominent role in the Libyan conflict has reportedly shifted its mission from acting as “a weapon 
of war to a tool of geopolitics”.123 It appears that through utilizing the Group in support of 
Haftar’s rebellion, the Kremlin aims to solidify a position of influence over the Libyan state or 
even just Haftar’s faction. Even if the war ends in favor of the U.N.-backed incumbent regime, 
the Kremlin will still have attained a higher degree of great power status through the Wagner 
Group’s involvement than it would have from sitting on the sidelines.  
 Rent-seeking is one area in which Wagner excels and is the aspect of Russian foreign 
policy that the Group most frequently addresses. Wagner’s involvement in Syria provided the 
Kremlin with multiple new sources of rents, all while operating under the guise of supporting the 
Assad regime during the conflict – an act that was supposedly solely of political/military concern 
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rather than economic. For example, Prigozhin’s company Evro Polis signed an agreement with 
Syria’s state-owned oil company that provided it with a quarter of the profits from oil and gas 
fields captured by the Wagner Group.124 Throughout Wagner’s entire time in Syria, many such 
agreements were formed, leading to the Deir al-Zour massacre and ultimately prolonging 
Wagner’s involvement in-country.125 Russia holds on to a significant portion of Syrian rents with 
agreements that will long outlive the conflict, thanks to the Wagner Group.  
While operating in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group 
has engaged in activities for local elites, thus developing relationships between these elites and 
the Kremlin, adding to the Russo-centric kleptocratic network. In Sudan, the president Omar al-
Bashir gave praise to Russia for sending specialists (Wagner fighters) for military training 
purposes. The Wagner Group conducted similar activities in the CAR, training military forces 
and the presidential guard and provided security for President Touadera. Through Wagner, the 
Kremlin developed a strong relationship with the CAR government to the point where a Russian 
diplomat is the CAR President’s national security advisor, and a team of five Russian military 
personnel serve as a permanent advisory staff to the CAR ministry of defense.126 The important 
distinction here is that training was not discussed with military officials but rather political elites, 
and the training of presidential guard units further emphasizes the importance of catering to 
specific individuals during these operations. As demonstrated in the CAR, a lasting relationship 
between Russian elites (likely integrated into the kleptocracy to some degree) and at least one 
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prominent African elite has developed. Consequently, Russian foreign policy has benefitted from 
the use of Wagner in these types of instances.  
During its debut in Ukraine, the Wagner Group exploited preexisting Ethnopopulist 
sentiments among the Ukrainian populace to garner support for the Russian invasion of the 
Donbass and annexation of Crimea. Like-minded individuals in Ukraine were recruited by the 
Wagner Group during the war, and many of these recruits went on to fight for Wagner in Syria 
as part of the Karpati (Карпаты) contingent responsible for conducting sabotage-related 
activities. These individuals were from all over Ukraine, not just the regions occupied by Russian 
forces, and were largely disgruntled with the Ukrainian government and its policies. Wagner is 
known to recruit individuals with Ethnopopulist beliefs and the members of Karpati likely 
followed this trend.127 As a result, this not only provided Wagner with additional recruits, but it 
developed ties between the Ethnopopulist pro-Russia leaning camp in Ukraine and the Kremlin.  
The Wagner Group is a tool of Russian foreign policy that helps the Kremlin pursue its 
central goals of great power status, external economic investment, and autocracy promotion. It 
serves as the quintessential tool of Russian foreign policy, as it reflects the domestic hybridity of 
Russian politics and the nearly comprehensive scope of Russian foreign policy. Since the 
Wagner Group was created in 2014, the Russian government has come to rely upon it more 
heavily than what was likely previously anticipated, and it holds a much more central role in 
Russian foreign policy than it did during the wars in Ukraine and Syria. If current trends 
continue, the Wagner Group will only become more integral to Russian foreign policy in the 
years to come.  
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CHAPTER III – PRESENTING THE CASES 
 
 
 In these case studies, I identify twelve indicators that demonstrate that the Wagner Group 
is a Russian state actor. Each indicator is evaluated differently and has different considerations 
that must be taken into account. These indicators are divided into two sets. The first set 
constructs a profile of the Wagner Group’s involvement in the conflict relative to that of the 
Russian military: The indicators in the first set are: the Wagner Group’s presence; the Russian 
military’s presence; the number of Wagner casualties; the number of Russian military casualties; 
the Wagner Group’s lethality in the conflict; the degree of Wagner rent-seeking activity; the 
level of Kremlin support provided to the Wagner Group. The second set demonstrates that the 
Wagner Group is a state actor, evaluating its role within the Kremlin’s strategy and interests in 
each conflict. The indicators in the second set are: the Kremlin’s diplomatic and strategic 
interests; the Kremlin’s economic interests; the degree of coordination between Wagner 
activities and Russian interests; the level of Russian state acknowledgement of the Wagner 
presence, and the Group’s overall level of success in the conflict. 
 
I. Discussing the First Set of Indicators 
 First, I explore the presence of the Wagner Group in the conflict. By presence, I am 
largely referring to the number of soldiers that the Wagner Group has sent to participate in its 
operations in-country. I look at the number of Wagner fighters present in-country during each 
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year of the conflict as well as the total number that passed through over the conflict’s full 
duration. Second, I examine the presence of official Russian military personnel in the conflict. I 
calculate the ratio of Wagner fighters to Russian military personnel in order to identify the 
relative importance of Wagner and Russian military personnel in each conflict.  
 Due to core differences between the conflicts analyzed in this thesis, there are at times 
disparities between cases in terms of how each indicator is addressed. The type of Russian 
military personnel sent to a certain conflict may, for example, vary. In the Ukrainian conflict, the 
only official Russian military presence was SPETSNAZ and other forms of Russian special 
forces, whereas in the Syrian conflict various regular Russian military units were also present. 
Consequently, the ratio is calculated differently in the two cases. In cases such as power 
projection in the Global South and the Libyan conflict, however, regular Russian military units 
were not present.  
 Third, I look at yearly casualties as well as the total number spanning the full duration of 
the conflict. I also look into the events that led to the casualties. Fourth, I want to know the 
number of official Russian military casualties. I discuss the Wagner to Russian military ratio of 
casualties experienced in the conflict. These two indicators directly interact with indicators one 
and two, further illustrating key disparities between the two parties being discussed. Specifically, 
these four indicators together highlight the exceptionally and disproportionately high number of 
Wagner casualties compared to Russian military casualties, especially given the typically 
significantly larger Russian military presence.  
 There are a few key considerations pertaining to the two aforementioned indicators. In 
Ukraine where the Russian military presence almost entirely consisted of special forces, it is 
unlikely that the publicly available numbers of Russian military personnel are complete and 
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accurate. In cases where there is little-to-no official Russian military presence, these indicators 
hold less weight, respectively. Another issue is potentially incomplete or inaccurate reporting on 
casualty numbers among both parties. This may affect the results of cross analyzing the first four 
indicators. For the sake of accuracy and transparency, I include extensive footnotes, elaborating 
on the credibility of certain sources and how I came to my final numbers.  
 Fifth, I examine the Wagner Group’s lethality in each conflict. By lethality, I am largely 
referring to the type of activities the Group is engaging in and ascertaining what proportion of 
those include the use of deadly force. I use three levels to measure this: low, medium, and high. 
More lethal activities include preforming shockwave functions, seizing resource sites, and 
conducting special forces operations, among others. Less lethal activities include guarding 
resource sites and protecting foreign elites, among others. This indicator interacts with the 
previous four indicators. It aims to address the question of ‘Why?’, establishing some of the root 
causes behind the presence and casualty disparities. Additionally, this indicator illustrates how 
the Kremlin utilities Wagner, focusing on the differences between each case.  
 This indicator is an equally important part of each case, as the Wagner Group engages in 
some amount of lethal activity in each conflict. The measurement, however, is universally 
applied across the four cases, allowing them to be compared with one another. In the case of 
power projection in the Global South, the lethality of Wagner varies from state to state.  
Therefore, I coalesce all activities across the Global South measure for lethality as if all 
operations occurred as part of the same conflict. This allows for maximum structural continuity 
and consistency between the four cases. While the quantity of Wagner kills can be considered for 
lethality, they are not the unit of measurement for this indicator, just a contributing factor when 
such data exists and can be consulted.  
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 Sixth, I measure the degree of rent-seeking by the Wagner Group. I identify the level of 
rent-seeking as being either low, medium, or high. To calculate this measurement, I take into 
account the quantity of rent-seeking operations being conducted by the Wagner Group in-
country, the amount of capital the Group is receiving from rent-related activities, and the 
presence or absence of Wagner’s economic or rent-related representatives in-country, such as 
Evro Polis or Prigozhin. Together, this and the fifth indicator provide a complete picture of the 
scope and nature of the Wager Group’s activities in each conflict. I compare the degree of 
activities that can be classified as rent-seeking with the degree of those that can be classified as 
lethal to shed light on the Wagner Group’s central purpose in each conflict and uncover global 
trends in terms of the Group’s roles and objectives.  
 One key consideration for evaluating rent-seeking pertains to the Global South case 
study. Rent-seeking plays a significant role; however, the type and scope of rent-seeking varies 
from state to state. I employ a similar method as in the evaluation of lethality across all cases of 
Wagner activity in the Global South. In Libya, rent-seeking is more complex than in the other 
cases, as the Wagner Group engages in both the capture rents and strategic market manipulation. 
In this case, I analyze the different components of a larger rent-based operation, rather than just 
conducting an inventory of rent captures and deals.  
 Seventh, I examine the degree of support provided to the Wagner Group by the Russian 
government. This indicator is measured as either being either low, medium, or high. Support 
includes operational assistance, conducting joint operations, logistical support such as providing 
transportation, medical support, the provision of supplies such as ammunition and special 
weaponry, diplomatic backing, and direct access to the Kremlin’s other services. By including 
this indicator, I shed light on the scope and nature of the Wagner Group’s relationship with the 
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Russian state. I also reveal the degree to which Wagner benefitted from assets typically reserved 
for official arms of the Russian government in each conflict.  
 One implication this criterion carries for certain cases is that in some, especially in some 
states within the Global South case, the publicly available data may suggest that there is a level 
of support from one of the two parties that resembles a measure of ‘no’ rather than low. In these 
instances, the measure of low will remain the lowest score achievable for this criterion. Since 
adequate evidence exists indicating that the Wagner Group broadly benefits from Russian state 
support in terms of transportation and logistics,128 it can be inferred that this applies to all 
Wagner deployments even if specific evidence pertaining to one state does not exist. In Syria, 
responsibility for supporting Wagner was split between the Kremlin and Assad’s regime.  
 
II. Discussing the Second Set of Indicators 
 First, I establish Russia’s diplomatic and strategic interests are in the conflict. This 
indicator does not discuss the Wagner Group and instead solely focuses on the Kremlin’s goals 
for each conflict. Russia’s diplomatic interests involve influencing local policy outcomes, 
changes in local leadership, the support of particular elites or groups in-country, and promoting 
autocracy while delegitimizing democratic parties, among others. Russian strategic interests 
involve its military’s broad collection of objectives pertaining to the conflict’s direction and 
outcome. By including this indicator, I seek to illustrate a profile of Russian diplomatic and 
strategic interests for each case study. Later, I compare these with Wagner’s activities to 
determine what degree of coordination exists between the Group and the Kremlin.  
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 Second, I establish Russia’s economic interests in the conflict. Russia’s economic 
interests capturing local rents, establishing deals with local elites, profiting from the military 
engagement when possible, and empowering the economies of ideologically like-minded allies, 
among others. I include this indicator for a similar reason as the previous one. I use this to 
establish the degree of coordination between Wagner’s activities and Russia’s economic interests 
in each case.  
 For these indicators, it is critical to consider both the official and unofficial interests of 
the Putin regime in each conflict. I also denote which interests are of a higher priority, when 
pertinent. While some are more widely reported on, this does not indicate that they are the most 
critical of the Kremlin’s interests. I remain careful when defining the Kremlin’s interests, as in 
some cases it claims one interest as a cover for others that are subject to a higher degree of 
scrutiny from the international community. The paradigm is Putin’s claim that his central interest 
is to combat jihadist terrorism in areas where the Wagner Group is suppressing democratic 
movements and engaging in widespread rent-seeking, such as in Syria and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Third, I establish the degree of alignment between the Wagner activities Kremlin 
interests. This is one of the most critical aspects of each case study, as it examines trends that 
indicate the Wagner Group’s status as a state actor. I draw from the evidence presented as part of 
the two previous indicators, and I measure this third indicator as being either low, medium, or 
high. Additionally, I present a condensed statement that outlines the most important areas of 
coordination between Wagner’s activities and the Kremlin’s interests.  
 In each case, there is an abundance of data on Russian diplomatic, strategic, and 
economic interests as well as on the Wagner Group’s activities. There are no key implications for 
any particular case as it pertains to this indicator. I focus on demonstrating the degree of 
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coordination between the Wagner Group and the Kremlin in each case when analyzing this 
indicator. I am to establish a causal relationship in each case, showcasing that in every instance 
of Wagner involvement, the Group operates at the behest of the Kremlin and the pursuit of 
Russian interests, not its own.  
 Fourth, determine the level of Kremlin acknowledgement of Wagner activity in each 
conflict. I do not attribute a standard measurement to this indicator in each case. Instead, I 
discuss the Kremlin’s official stance, inherent contradictions to that stance, and any inadvertent 
recognition of the Wagner Group in the conflict. Inherent contradictions include various forms of 
widespread local recognition of Wagner involvement in the conflict, largely. Inadvertent 
recognition involves comments from Kremlin officials, publications by Russian state media, and 
leaked photo, video, or audio evidence confirming Kremlin acknowledgment.  
 This indicator carries one key consideration for the Global South and Libya. In both of 
these cases, the Wagner Group is the only Russian actor operating on the ground. I consider 
Russian acknowledgment of what Kremlin officials call ‘Russian specialists’ sent to aid or train 
local security or military forces as an acknowledgment of the Wagner presence.129  
 Last, I evaluate whether the Wagner Group was successful in each conflict. I measure this 
indicator as being either low, medium, or high. In evaluating this indicator, I consider the 
proportion of Wagner casualties, the number of failed operations, and whether it achieved the 
Kremlin’s goals. I also consider the magnitude of the Group’s role in the conflict’s outcome, and 
whether the outcome was in line with Russian interests. Additional factors contribute to 
Wagner’s involvement being a success, such as effective coordination between the Group and 
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the Kremlin, the achievement of broader Russian foreign policy goals, and operations 
independently run by the Wagner Group.  
 There is one additional consideration when evaluating this indicator. In the Global South, 
I account for the substantial erosion of the Wagner Group’s plausible deniability and the broad 
inadvertent acknowledgement of its activities by the Russian state. I argue that, because this 
occurs to such a high degree, it affects the level of overall success Wagner experienced in the 
Global South. If the Wagner Group erodes one of its most valuable assets while taking part in a 
conflict, its involvement should not be considered highly successful.  
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"In peace one is despoiled by mercenaries; 
in war by one's enemies." 
–Niccolò Machiavelli 
 
 In this chapter, I present the case of the Wagner Group’s involvement in the Ukrainian 
intrastate conflict and annexation of Crimea. This case serves as the Group’s debut on the world 
stage as a tool of Russian foreign policy. It also showcases Wagner’s ability to operate both 
independently of and in tandem with official Russian military forces. Most importantly, in this 
case I demonstrate that the Wagner Group is a state actor by revealing the close integration of 
Utkin’s hybrid-PMC into the Russian state and its integral role in the Kremlin’s strategy for this 
conflict. First, I provide a background on Russian involvement in the conflict. Second, I evaluate 
the first set of indicators, profiling the Wagner Group’s role in the conflict. Third, I evaluate the 
second set of indicators, and demonstrate that the Wanger Group is a Russian state actor in this 
conflict.  
A private paramilitary detachment led by Dmitry Utkin, the Wagner Group made its 
debut as a tool of Russian hybrid warfare and foreign policy during the 2014 Ukraine crisis and 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. In this case, I analyze the set of criteria outlined in the 
previous chapter as it pertains to the Ukrainian conflict. One of the quintessential cases of 
Wagner activity (and the first), this conflict showcases the Group’s ability to work both 
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independently of and in tandem with official Russian military forces. It also illustrates the 
Wagner Group’s broad scope of operations, including preforming shockwave functions, 
engaging in special forces activities, seizing critical infrastructure sites, and other related tasks. 
This conflict serves as a developmental period for the Wagner Group, and is necessary to include 
as a case in this project, because it is the earliest documented case of the Wagner Group’s use by 
the Russian state, the only case of direct Wagner involvement in Europe and Russia’s near-
abroad, and an excellent example of the use of the Wagner Group to perform special forces 
functions.  
 
I. Background on Russian Involvement in the Ukrainian Intrastate Conflict 
 The conflict in Ukraine was sparked by the violent state response to the November 2013 
Maidan protests in Kiev.130 Yanukovych’s response, which resulted in the deaths of 77 
individuals protesting his rejection of a deal aimed at increasing economic integration with the 
E.U., inadvertently drew more protesters and escalated the conflict.131 Consequently, 
Yanukovych fled the country in February 2014, and the subsequent election of Poroshenko 
mobilized pro-Russian groups who viewed him as too pro-West.132 The actual fighting began in 
2014 and eventually transitioned to a stalemate, consisting of shelling and skirmishes.133 
 
130 BBC 2020; Council on Foreign Relations 2021.  
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 In March 2014, Russian forces entered Crimea, took control, and annexed the peninsula 
in response to a “disputed local referendum” and alleged local support.134 By May 2014, similar 
referendums emerged in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and pro-Russian separatists 
seized territory and government offices.135 Hostilities were traded between the Ukrainian military 
and Russian-backed separatists and began to escalate until a cease fire in September 2014.136 The 
cease fire was ultimately broken when Russian tanks crossed the border into Ukraine in 
November 2014.137 Since February of 2015, there have been multiple attempts to establish a 
peace through the Minsk Accords without any success.138  
 
II. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group’s Role in the Ukrainian Intrastate 
Conflict 
 The Wagner Group was present at and engaged in multiple stages of the Ukrainian 
conflict. In the annexation of Crimea, it is clear the Wagner Group was present.139 However, 
there are conflicting reports pertaining to the scope of the Group’s presence in Crimea.140 In 
Luhansk, the Wagner Group was widely involved, taking the lead on Russia’s operations in the 
 
134 Council on Foreign Relations 2021; United States Government 2015. The quoted material is from the CFR.  
 
135 BBC 2020; Council on Foreign Relations 2021; United States Government 2015.  
 
136 United States Government 2015.  
 
137 Ibid.  
 
138 Council on Foreign Relations 2021.  
 
139 Долгарева 2018; Marten 2019; Sukhankin 2019; Zoria 2019. Долгарева consists of an interview with a former 
Wagner fighter and Russian soldier involved in the conflict in Ukraine.  
 
140 Sukhankin 2019. This article discusses conflicting arguments between one of the leading investigative journalists 
on Wagner and Ukraine. Korotkov argues that Wagner Group had a minor role in Crimea, whereas Ukraine argues 
that Wagner Group was primarily responsible for the annexation.  
55 
   
region.141 This included the capture of Luhansk’s airport and coordination with pro-Russia 
separatists.142 After capturing Luhansk, the Wagner Group provided critical support to Russian 
forces in the decisive battle of Debaltseve.143 They did so by traveling from Luhansk, past 
Krasnodon, down the highway from Sorokyn, to a small wooded village where the Group 
reinforced Russian and pro-Russian troops and prepared for the upcoming battle.144 It appears 
that post-Debaltseve, the Wagner Group was not involved in Donetsk.  
 The Russian military had a direct presence at multiple stages of the Ukrainian conflict. In 
Crimea, Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF), SPETSNAZ-GRU, and traditional military 
forces were all involved in the annexation.145 In Luhansk, the Russian military was not present. 
During the battle of Debaltseve, the Russian military was involved, directly and broadly.146 
Specifically, the Kremlin sent hundreds to thousands of soldiers, an array of tanks and other 
militarized vehicles, and issued commands to Wagner before and throughout the battle.147 In 
 
141 DFRLab 2018; Долгарева 2018; Gostev and Coalson 2016; Marten 2019; Sukhankin 2019; Zoria 2018; Zoria 
2019. From Sukhankin: the number of Wagner fighters in the Donbass grew from 86-250 to ~1,500 in a matter of 
months.  
 
142 Gostev and Coalson 2016; Жуковский 2017. From Жуковский: 72 Wagner fighters took part in the airport’s 
capture. 
 
143 DFRLab 2018; Жуковский 2017; Zoria 2018 
 
144 DFRLab 2018; Integral 2018; СБУ June 2018. Video footage taken by a Wagner fighter (Integral) left behind at 
the battle site reveals the route taken by his contingent from Luhansk to Debaltseve as they move to reinforce 
Russian/pro-Russian forces. Coordination between Wagner and the Russian military in the move to reinforce troops 
at Debaltseve is corroborated in a phone call between Utkin and a high-ranking Russian military official leaked by 
the SBU (СБУ). DFRLab assists in tracking the Group’s movements, providing geolocated data on the precise path 
the reinforcing Wagner contingent took. 
 
145 Sukhankin 2019; United States Government 2015. The traditional military forces suspected or known to be 
involved included two air assault divisions, three airborne divisions, a reconnaissance regiment, the black sea fleet, 
and a naval infantry brigade. The SOF specifically seized critical Ukrainian government and military sites.  
 
146 DFRLab 2018; СБУ January 2018; СБУ June 2018.   
 
147 Ibid. The January 2018 phone call revealed the Kremlin sent 7 tanks, 5 BMP, and 2 BTRa in addition to soldiers.  
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Donetsk, the Russian military took the lead, having sent multiple divisions to the region.148 It is 
important to note the prevalence of SPETSNAZ in this conflict, as much of the Kremlin’s 
presence was in this form. SPETSNAZ greatly resemble the Wagner Group, as they aim to be 
plausibly deniable while conducting similar activities, recruiting from the local populations they 
invade, and typically appearing as unmarked combatants.149 Most significantly, the Russian 
military’s presence in the conflict took the form of command over all pro-Russian parties 
involved. This is evident in multiple phone calls between Utkin and high-ranking Russian 
military officials, among other reports.150 
 A clear and direct coordination between the Wagner Group and Russian military 
throughout the conflict is evident. The two acted as equal branches of the Russian armed forces, 
having engaged in different activities that coalesced into a single coordinated incursion. 
Additionally, both took their orders from the Russian state, and in the case of Crimea and 
Debaltseve, they even merged into a single military force. This demonstrates the Wagner 
Group’s role as a state actor, as in Ukraine it was fully absorbed into the Russian state’s military 
infrastructure, held an integral role in the pursuit of Russian interests in-country, and was 
subjugated completely to the Russian military command. 
 The Wagner Group suffered relatively heavy losses in Ukraine, with a casualty rate of 
approximately 15-20% for each battle and an estimated total of 67 losses throughout the 
 
148 Долгарева 2018. In this interview, former reserve captain in the RF armed forces confirms the Kremlin’s 
presence in the Donetsk region, discussing the involvement of both her brigade and a sperate airmobile brigade.  
 
149 Reeves and Wallace 2015; United States Government 2015.  
 
150 Boldyrev 2015; СБУ January 2018; СБУ June 2018; Prothero 2020. Prothero reveals the involvement of Russian 
military command in the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.  
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conflict.151 It is possible that the actual number may be higher, as reporting on Груз 200 (Gruz 
200, meaning Cargo 200 or bodies of those killed in action) revealed that over 250 coffins 
carrying Russian fighters traveled from Ukraine to Russia from the conflict’s start to February 
2015.152 Reporting on Russian military casualties in Ukraine is scarce. Despite comments from a 
U.S. Department of State official that the number of Russian casualties was likely 400-500 men, 
more definitive reports have revealed that 2,000 or more Russian military personnel were killed 
in Ukraine by February 2015.153 In this case, both the Wagner Group and the Russian military 
sustained significant casualties. This is reflective of the two parties holding equal roles of 
importance in the pursuit of Russian objectives in the conflict. Evident in the Cargo 200 
reporting, both Wagner fighters and Russian military personnel were treated as state combatants 
by the Kremlin.  
 In Ukraine, the Wagner Group engaged in a wide variety of lethal activities, serving 
multiple functions of the Russian state throughout the conflict. First, it engaged in many 
offensive operations, including the capture of Luhansk, partisan warfare, diversion-sabotage, 
continuous attacks on the front line, and spearheading the offensive at Debaltseve.154 Wagner’s 
offensive capabilities were most prominently shown at Debaltseve, as the Group advanced in 
 
151 Долгарева 2018; Sukhankin 2019; Жуковский 2017. This rate is derived from a range of 10% to 20% illustrated 
by Sukhankin, a separate account of the losses sustained at Luhansk airport, and number provided by a former 
Wagner fighter. From Sukhankin and Жуковский: in Luhansk, 15 of the 72 fighters involved were killed. From 
Sukhankin, 21 of the 205 Wagner fighters involved in Debaltseve were killed. The total estimated number of losses 
was originally published by the SBU.  
 
152 Яшин и Шорина 2015. This report was initiated by Boris Nemtsov prior to his assassination. It is not entirely 
clear whether these coffins carried Wagner fighters, SPETSNAZ, or both; however, it is clear that they carried 
individuals with whom the Kremlin did not want to have a clear connection.  
 
153 Gregory 2015; Kenasari 2015. The Russian state awarded payments to families upon the death of an immediate 
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coordination with the supporting Russian military forces, taking machinegun and artillery fire 
from the Ukrainian side and clearing the way for Russian armor to advance.155 Throughout the 
conflict, Wagner also provided support to the Russian military, specifically supporting SOF, 
providing reinforcements at key positions, and liaising with the LNR on behalf of the Kremlin.156 
The Kremlin also used the Wagner Group to maintain positions previously captured by either 
Russian military or pro-Russian forces.157 
 While fighting on behalf of the Kremlin in Ukraine, the Wagner Group proved especially 
lethal in two areas. First, it demonstrated its strong shockwave capabilities, utilizing jeeps with 
machineguns and engaging in quick, aggressive, and tactical offensives followed by rapid 
retreats. 158 Second, it demonstrated its ability to maintain the Kremlin’s control over local 
groups by eliminating those that were not sufficiently subservient to the Russian state.159 The 
Wagner Group’s degree of lethality in Ukraine is not typical of a state-contracted nonstate actor. 
Wagner’s various roles in the conflict directly supplemented and complemented those of the 
Russian military, and the Group acted as the Kremlin’s primary quasi-special forces organ in the 
conflict. This further demonstrates that the Wagner Group is a state actor, as in Ukraine it 
engaged in a near-comprehensive scope of operations, assisting at every stage in the Kremlin’s 
 
155 Integral 2018; СБУ January 2018; Zoria 2018. The video from Integral includes scenes of a Wagner commander 
issuing orders on the front lines, taking heavy fire from across the field, and being supported by Russian armor after 
the initial Wagner advance.  
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incursion. No nonstate actor is capable of this level of coordination with a state on this broad of 
an operational scope. 
 In Ukraine, the Wagner Group did not engage in any rent-seeking operations; however, it 
remained careful to not destroy the preexisting oil infrastructure during combat by avoiding 
preemptive bombing or shelling.160 
 A high degree of Russian state support was provided to the Wagner Group in the 
Ukrainian conflict. Most notably, the Kremlin provided Wagner with a significant number of 
Vystrels and other armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery.161 A great deal of Kremlin command-
related support was provided to the Wagner Group in this conflict, including instruction and 
orders from high-ranking Russian officers prior to the battle, maps of the battlefield, and a direct 
line of communication to the Kremlin during the height of the battle for Debaltseve.162 
Additionally, as evident from the section on Wagner casualties, the Russian state provided 
extensive resources in terms of transporting the hybrid-PMC’s dead back to Russia.163 In this 
case, the Wagner Group received a degree of support from the Kremlin near-equal to that 
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III. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group as a State Actor in Ukraine 
 Russia invaded Ukraine with a few key diplomatic and strategic interests in 
consideration. First, the Kremlin was seeking a remedy for ongoing domestic instability and 
discontent.164 Russian policymakers viewed the annexation of Crimea and invasion of the 
Donbass as a deterrent for future Euromaidans, a cultural and historical win for the Russian 
people, and a distraction from Putin’s declining popularity at home.165 Second, Russian 
policymakers viewed the potential integration of Ukraine into the E.U. as a threat to the 
Kremlin’s control over its near-abroad, assuming that an integration into NATO would follow 
shortly after.166 Establishing a zone in the Donbass subservient to the Putin’s regime would 
greatly assist in preventing any integration into the E.U. or NATO.167 Third, the Russian 
government was greatly interested in integrating the 1.45 million ethnic Russians that lived in 
Crimea as a means to boost the state’s popularity at home168 and to mobilize the Russian 
diaspora abroad. 
 While less significant than the Kremlin’s diplomatic and strategic interests in the conflict, 
a few economic interests contributed to Russia’s decision to invade. First, Russia was greatly 
interested in the Black Sea region’s energy transportation routes.169 Second, there was a desire to 
keep Ukrainian markets and jobs within Russia’s sphere of economic influence, which would 
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have been impossible in the case of E.U. integration.170 Third, Russia greatly relies on access to 
Ukrainian gas pipelines to maintain its European customers.171 
 In this conflict, the Wagner Group’s activities aligned with Russian interests to a high 
degree. Wagner’s involvement was critical in establishing and maintaining Russian control in 
Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk. The Group proved that in future Euromaidans, the Kremlin can 
rely on it to maintain Russian control or influence over the affected area.  
 While the Russian state has repeatedly and consistently denied any involvement in the 
Ukrainian conflict, denoting the fighters as “volunteers”,172 it has failed to conceal its connection 
to the Wagner Group in this case in multiple ways. The Wagner fighters were paid in Russian 
rubles,173 which indicates that their paychecks were either being sent to or spent in the Russian 
Federation. Additionally, the Kremlin permitted the construction of statues of Wagner fighters in 
Luhansk,174 succumbing to a desire for praise and good press. Russia also awarded military 
commendations to Utkin for the Group’s actions in Ukraine,175 denoting an acknowledgement of 
Wagner activity in-country on behalf of the Kremlin.  
 Information on the Wagner Group’s involvement in Ukraine was relatively difficult to 
find. Since the Wagner Group’s identity was unclear during the conflict, literature analyzing its 
involvement is scarce in comparison with the other cases. Russian-language primary sources, 
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whether interviews, the video footage, or phone conversations leaked by the SBU, were integral 
in gaining a complete understanding of Wagner’s role in this conflict as a state actor.  
 In Ukraine, the Wagner Group experienced a high degree of success. The hybrid-PMC 
thrived in this environment and demonstrated its strong ability to quickly spearhead offensives, 
seize territory, maintain control over that territory, and then mobilize to support Russian forces in 
adjacent regions. An incredibly close degree of coordination between Wagner and the Russian 
military was evident in this conflict, and the Group demonstrated its strong ability to integrate 
itself into the Kremlin’s grand strategy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was successful in 
meeting the Kremlin’s diplomatic/strategic and economic objectives. It is evident that this 
success would have been unachievable without the Wagner Group, as it was one of Russia’s 
most valuable assets at every stage in the order of battle.  
 The Wagner Group’s involvement in the Ukrainian intrastate conflict demonstrates that it 
is a state actor. Completely integrated into the Russian military structure, the Wagner Group is 
tasked with a clear directive that complements the directive given to Russian SPETSNAZ and 
SOF. Moreover, in this conflict the Wagner Group is completely subordinated to the Russian 
military leadership and benefits from Russian military support in a way that is only attributed to 
a state actor. The absence of external leadership, external interests and directives, and external 
support and resources makes it impossible for the Wagner Group to be considered a nonstate 
actor in this conflict. No nonstate PMC or paramilitary group is provided with the responsibility, 
trust, support, and operational scope that the Kremlin provided to its hybrid-PMC. 
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CHAPTER V – CASE STUDY: THE SYRIAN INTRASTATE CONFLICT 
 
 
“Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.” 
-President Ronald Reagan 
 
 
“Let us therefore animate and encourage each other,  
and show the whole world that a Freeman,  
contending for liberty on his own ground,  
is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth.” 
 




 Wagner’s involvement in Syria serves as the quintessential example of its operational 
capacity. Syria served as a critical developmental period for the Wagner Group, and gave way to 
the “Syria model”, which involves exporting protection and support to authoritarian leaders in 
exchange for rents and strategic assets. This case further demonstrates that the Wagner Group is 
a Russian state actor, as it shows the hybrid-PMC’s deep ties with the Kremlin and its close and 
coordinated pursuit of Russian state interests. In this chapter, I first provide a background on 
Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict. Second, I discuss the first set of indicators, profiling 
Wagner’s role in Syria. Third, I evaluate the second set of indicators, and I demonstrate that the 
Wagner Group is a Russian state actor.  
Acting almost as if it was an additional branch of the Russian armed forces, the Wagner 
Group became substantially more notorious during its 2015-2018 or potentially ongoing 
involvement in the Syrian intrastate conflict. Analyzing the criteria outlined in Chapter IV, this 
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case serves as possibly the most paradigmatic and comprehensive example of the Wagner 
Group’s operational scope and potential to benefit Russian foreign policy and military 
objectives. This case demonstrates the Wagner Group’s role in military operations when deeply 
integrated with official Russian military personnel, and it depicts the “Syria model” of exporting 
“protection and support to authoritarian leaders in exchange for access to strategic assets and 
military bases”176, which has been extended across the Global South, as Chapter VIII will 
demonstrate. The Syrian conflict is the most widely discussed example of Wagner activity in 
both the academic and policy literature, and it is critical to include in this thesis, because it is the 
first instance in which the Wagner Group employed a full range of operations, the first example 
of the Group’s use as a tool of Russian rent-seeking, and the example of Wagner activity with the 
largest amount of publicly available information.  
 
I. Background on Russian Involvement in the Syrian Intrastate Conflict  
 In March 2011, pro-democracy protests erupted in Syria. These protests coupled with a 
violent response from the Assad regime and a subsequent proliferation of opposition groups 
ignited the Syrian conflict.177 By 2012, fighting between the various opposition groups and the 
regime began in the capital of Damascus as well as in Aleppo.178 The civilian death toll from the 
conflict rose rapidly between 2011 and 2013, partly due to the regime’s use of chemical 
weapons, including sarin nerve gas.179 Reports also indicate that from April to July in 2014, 
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chlorine was weaponized by the Assad regime against the opposition groups.180 Over time, the 
Assad regime acquired more territory, pushing back both the opposition and the Islamic State.181 
The aforementioned war crimes and military success of the Assad regime resulted in a massive 
humanitarian crisis.182 Each round of peace talks has been unsuccessful, partly due to the 
complications brought on by a large number of state and nonstate actors that had become 
involved in the conflict.183 
 Russia has held a prominent role in the Syrian conflict. Largely interested in preventing 
the collapse of the Assad regime, the Kremlin decided to become involved in the conflict.184 
While the Kremlin began assisting the Syrian state in minor ways as early as 2011, it did not 
engage in a full military intervention until September 2015.185 The aforementioned interest, 
along others discussed in this case study, played a role in the 2015 decision to provide direct 
military support, and the capture of Palmyra by the Islamic State likely hastened the decision.186 
Additionally, the vacuum of external leadership in the Middle East left by the United States 
provided the Kremlin with ample opportunity to become the conflict’s key interventionist 
actor.187 
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II. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group’s Role in the Syrian Intrastate Conflict 
 The Wagner Group’s presence in Syria began in 2013, while the hybrid-PMC was still in 
the form of the Slavonic Corps.188 Consisting of a 267-man team divided into two detachments, 
the detachment led by Dmitry Utkin can be considered the first group of Wagner fighters to 
operate in Syria.189 The quantity of Wagner fighters greatly increased upon the onset of the direct 
Russian military intervention into Syria. From 2015 to 2017, 3000 Wagner fighters had been sent 
to Syria.190 By 2018, the total reached 5000 fighters.191 From 2016 to 2018, various reports 
reveal that at any given time, somewhere from 2000 to 2500 Wagner fighters were operating in 
Syria.192  
 In terms of the presence of official Russian military personnel, reports reveal that 
between 2015 and 2018, there were 63,000 members of the Russian military who “received 
combat experience”193in Syria since the Russian intervention began.194 The Russian military 
possessed full scope of operations in this conflict with a large leadership presence (434 generals 
and 26,000 officers present throughout the conflict), 4349 rocket troops and artillery, 87% of 
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Information on the number of Russian military personnel who took part in the Syrian intrastate conflict is scarce – 
no other source contradicting the number published by the Russian Federation exists. The credibility of the Russian 
state in these matters is limited.  
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units possessing operational-tactical capabilities, near-total accessibility to military-transport 
aircraft, and 60% of units receiving support from strategic and long-range aircraft.195 
Furthermore, despite Putin’s public order to withdraw the Russian military from Syria in 2017, 
Russian troops remained in-country through 2018.196 Of the combined Wagner-Kremlin military 
might present in the Syrian conflict, the Wagner Group consists of a measly 7.4% of 
personnel.197  
 Despite entering the country in smaller numbers, the Wagner Group experienced a much 
higher degree of casualties among its fighters compared to those experienced by Russian military 
personnel. From April-May to December of 2016, 32 Wagner fighters were killed and 80 
wounded in the liberation of Palmyra from the Islamic State.198 From April to December of 
2017, 130 or more Wagner fighters were have reported to have been killed.199 In 2018, a 
skirmish between U.S. military forces and Wagner fighters known as the Deir al-Zour massacre 
resulted in approximately 100 Wagner casualties.200 A report from Reuters citing various 
interviews with Wagner fighters and their associates corroborates that the number of casualties at 
Deir al-Zour was near 100 and expands, citing that up to an additional 200 were injured.201 
 
195 Гуща 2018. This information underscores the significant scope of Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict.  
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Official statements from the Russian state contradicted these numbers, citing several dozen 
casualties of Russian nationals.202 Additionally, from January 2017 to February 2018, 40 to 60 
Wagner fighters were killed while the Group was capturing oil and gas fields near Palmyra, 
Aleppo, and Latakia.203 This compares to reported casualties among Russian military personnel, 
which were 25 in 2016, ranged from 41-58 in 2017, 44-47 in 2018, and 4 in 2020.204 Based on 
the aforementioned data, the Wagner Group suffered slightly under three times as many 
casualties as the Russian military in Syria (302-322 for Wagner compared to 114-134+ for the 
Russian military).  
 In the Syrian conflict, the Wagner Group has proven to be especially lethal, and they 
have engaged in a variety of combat-oriented activities. Wagner fighters were used as elite 
infantry in Syria, even engaging in special operations against the Islamic State.205 While the 
Group began in 2015-2016 with reconnaissance activities and some small-scale combat, they 
escalated to large-scale combat in the second half of 2016, and they transformed into a more 
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paramilitary-style outfit from 2017 onward.206 According to a former Wagner officer, when 
engaging in combat, the Group takes on a shockwave function, spearheading the offensive.207 
 The Wagner Group has engaged in a high degree of rent-seeking in Syria through Evro 
Polis, a shell company linked to Prigozhin and contracted by the Russian Energy Ministry.208 
Evro Polis holds a central role in Wagner’s operations, having been cited by a former fighter as 
the company with which he initially signed an agreement before traveling to Syria to fight with 
the Group.209 Reports reveal that Evro Polis agreed to capture and guard various oil fields for the 
Syrian state-run petroleum company in exchange for 25% of the profits generated by the fields 
plus military expenditures.210 The contract expires in 2022; however, it is likely that such 
contracts will continue as Evro Polis promotes itself, has established an office in Damascus, and 
similar companies pursue similar agreements.211  
 In Syria, the Wagner Group received a high degree of support from the Russian state and 
a low degree of support from the Syrian state during the Group’s involvement in the conflict. 
From 2015 through 2016, there was a close coordination of activities between the Wagner Group 
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and the Russian military.212 For Wagner, this included joint-operations, assistance in treating and 
evacuating wounded fighters, the provision of ammunition, weapons supplies, military hardware, 
air support, artillery support, and access to the same military commendations as Russian 
soldiers.213 By 2017, the official Russian support to the Wagner Group diminished greatly, and it 
fell upon the Syrian government to finance Wagner’s operations.214 Allegedly the result of 
infighting among the private and state individuals tied to Wagner’s Syrian operations, this lack 
of support culminated at the Group’s massive defeat at Dier al-Zour.215 
 
III. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group as a State Actor in Syria 
 The Russian government’s diplomatic and strategic interests in Syria since the onset of 
the conflict have been to prevent the Assad regime’s collapse due to the state’s role as a foothold 
in the Middle East,216 to prevent another percieved ‘color revolution,’217 and to return to “the 
high table of international politics”.218 The Kremlin claims a core interest in the conflict is 
combatting jihadist terrorism,219 but the U.S. argues that this is minimal compared to supporting 
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the regime and combatting the opposition.220 Russian economic interests in the conflict were the 
continuance of arms sales to the Syrian state and the protection of Russia’s exclusive access to 
Syrian oil and gas.221 Prior to the conflict, Russia held oil and gas contracts with Syria extending 
out to 2038.222 Similar contracts have proliferated in recent years,223 and just two such contracts 
alone consisted of access to no less than 500 billion cubic meters of gas reserves.224  
 The Wagner Group’s activities aligned to a high degree with the Kremlin’s interests in 
the Syrian conflict. Specifically, Wagner was integral in combatting the democratic opposition 
and Islamic State, engaging in much of the actual combat on behalf of the Assad regime, and it 
aggressively pursued Russian economic interests pertaining to oil and gas.  
 In this conflict, the Wagner Group catered to two principal customers. First, it was 
contracted by the Russian state, allegedly overseen by the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence 
agency.225 In December 2016, Russia negotiated a contract between Syria and the Wagner 
Group, via the shell company Evro Polis.226 From this point on, the Syrian state has held sole 
responsibility for Wagner in the country, reportedly working more directly with Prigozhin.227  
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225 Peter 2018; Sukhankin 2019. There is a lack of concrete/verified data on this. The language used throughout the 
literature in cited statements/documents from Russian Federation or Wagner members greatly insinuates this.  
226 Marten 2019. Russian Energy Minister facilitates the signing of a MOU between the two.  
 
227 Sukhankin 2019; Vasilyeva 2017. 
 
72 
   
 An exceptionally low level of Kremlin acknowledgment of the Wagner presence in Syria 
has taken place despite wide media and academic coverage of the Russia-based Group’s role in 
the conflict. This low-level of acknowledgment has been taken to an extreme resembling apathy 
or denunciation, as various reports reveal the Kremlin provides near-no acknowledgement of 
Wagner casualties,228 and has resorted to bribery, deceit, and intimidation to keep loved ones 
quiet.229 Additionally, there has been a near-equally low level of acknowledgment pertaining to 
the rent-seeking contracts of Wagner and Evro Polis in Syria.230 However, when Evro Polis 
engaged in COVID-19 relief activities in Syria, “from Russia with lots of love” was written on 
the delivery.231 Conversely, the media and academic coverage of the Wagner Group’s role in the 
Syrian conflict has been broad. Information pertaining to this case study was especially easy to 
find, and nearly all of Wagner’s known activities in Syria were reported on widely and in detail.  
 In Syria, the Wagner Group experienced a high degree of success. It was tasked with 
maintaining the power of the Assad regime, eliminating the democratic opposition and jihadist 
groups in areas with significant oil and gas reserves, and maintaining control over critical rents 
for the benefit of both Assad and the Kremlin. The Group experienced a major failure at Deir al-
Zour, which led to increased scrutiny of its activities and attention directed at its connections 
 
228 BBC 2018; Бушуев 2017; Гуща 2018; Moscow Times 2020; Sukhankin 2019; Vasilyeva 2017. The only 
exception to the rule of no acknowledgement was the incident at Deir al-Zour; however, the Kremlin greatly 
diminished the actual numbers of fighters lost and decried them as (from Гуща 2018, citing the Russian Ministry of 
Defense): a few dozen Russian citizens and citizens of CIS states that were wounded or killed of their own will and 
for different goals.  
 
229 Бушуев 2017; Vasilyeva 2017. Бушуев discusses a case in which a contractor died in 2015, and the Kremlin 
alleged it was a suicide due to relations with a woman. His family and girlfriend have fervently decried that this is 
false.  
 
230 Haaretz 2017. The author cites a comment from the Kremlin press secretary – “We do not monitor some 
entrepreneurial activity [of Russian companies abroad]”.  
 
231 Mackinnon 2020. 
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with the Russian government. However, despite failing to maintain as strong of a sense of 
plausible deniability as it has in other states, it accomplished each of its objectives with the cost-
effectiveness, efficiency, and expendability expected by its employers. Wagner’s success in 
Syria in terms of defending the incumbency of authoritarian leaders in exchange for access to 
rents and other strategic assets has enabled it to increase the quantity and scope of such 
operations, which now span globally.232 Therefore, this was not just a success for the Wagner 
Group and the Kremlin but a failure for the U.S. and its allies, as the Syrian conflict developed a 
Russian paramilitary outfit into a hybrid-PMC capable of catering to a wide variety of the 
Kremlin’s interests abroad.  
 The Wagner Group’s involvement in Syria greatly demonstrated that it is a state actor. 
Seamlessly coordinating its activities with the activities of Russian military personnel and the 
Kremlin’s interests in the conflict, the Wagner Group evolved into an actor resembling a branch 
of the Russian military. In this conflict, the Wagner Group demonstrated its broad operational 
scope and that it can competently take part in both small and large conflicts. The Group’s 
capabilities and coordination with the Russian state in Syria further demonstrated that it is a state 
actor, representing the Kremlin and its interests.   
 
232 U.S. House, Armed Services 2020. The source discusses the “Syria model”, which is defined above.  
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“Africa is a paradox which illustrates and highlights  
neo-colonialism. Her earth is rich, yet the products  
that come from above and below the soil continue to  
enrich, not Africans predominantly, but groups and  




 In this chapter, I discuss the Wagner Group’s role in projecting the Russian state’s power 
throughout the Global South. Operating in a variety of states, the Group’s activities greatly 
indicate that it is a state actor. This chapter demonstrates that Wagner is capable of individually 
pursuing Russian interests and promoting Russian grand strategy for the Global South. In this 
chapter, I first provide a background on the Wagner Group’s involvement in this area. Second, I 
discuss the first set of indicators, profiling Wagner’s role in Russian power projection in the 
Global South. Third, I discuss the second set of indicators, and I demonstrate that the Wagner 
Group is a Russian state actor.  
 Operating in states throughout the Global South, the Wagner Group has been 
aggressively pursuing Russian diplomatic, strategic, and economic interests in a coordinated, 
worldwide fashion. In this case, I analyze the set of criteria outlined in Chapter IV to 
demonstrate that the Wagner Group post-Syria has evolved into an entity resembling a state 
agency. I demonstrate that the Wagner Group post-Syria became capable of operating without 
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direct state support while also closely coordinating its actions with Russian state interests and 
grand strategy for the Global South. It is critical to understand that Wagner involvement in the 
Global South is an evolution prompted by the Group’s success in Syria (i.e., the exportation of 
the Syria model abroad). Moreover, in this chapter I show how the Wagner Group has evolved to 
become the sole Russian state agency responsible for promoting Russian interests in the Global 
South, and how it has become increasingly integrated into the Kremlin’s power projection 
infrastructure. While Syria and Libya are considered part of the Global South, this chapter 
focuses on the Kremlin’s concerted effort to project power, gain influence, and curry favor 
among states that are typically overlooked by the West and other global powers.  
 
I. Background on the Wagner Group’s Involvement in the Global South 
 The Wagner Group’s involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa began either in late 2017 or 
early 2018 after the Group first established a presence in Libya through the Libyan Cement 
Company.233 Wagner became involved in Sudan in either late 2017 or early 2018, and the 
Group’s presence spread to the Central African Republic (CAR) in early 2018.234 In April 2018, 
the Wagner Group was sent to Madagascar alongside FSB and GRU personnel.235 In May 2018, 
the Group’s presence spread to Venezuela and grew as new fighters were sent in 2019.236 In 
 
233 Cragin and Mackenzie 2020. 
 
234 Левиев 2018; Мыльников 2019. From Левиев, who is a journalist at the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) a 
Moscow-based organization that uses Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) to track the activities of the Russian 
military, Russian intelligence, and the Wagner Group overseas: reporting has revealed that the Wagner Group was in 
Sudan prior to the CAR.  
 
235 Баданин 2019.  
 
236 Sukhankin January 2019; Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019. 
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September 2019, Wagner sent fighters to Mozambique as well, but the Group has since left the 
country.237 The Wagner Group’s sister PMC, Patriot, has been involved in Yemen and Burundi, 
beginning in 2018.238 Reports exist of Wagner involvement in states other than those I have 
included.239 Due to the scope of this chapter, I focus on the aforementioned states.  
 
II. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group’s Role in Russian Power Projection in the 
Global South 
 Many states in the Global South have experienced or are currently experiencing a 
Wagner Group presence. The scope of this presence varies between states. In the CAR, reports 
vary in terms of how many Wagner fighters are present in the country, but CIT confirmed the 
initial deployment consisted of 170 individuals.240 Wagner’s presence spans from the 
southwestern corner of the CAR to the border with Sudan.241 Photographic evidence has revealed 
that Wagner fighters travel over the CAR-Sudan border frequently,242 and it is likely fighters 
 
237 Marten September 2020. The Wagner Group left Mozambique in March 2020 and has reportedly been replaced 
by a South African group.  
 
238 Sukhankin October 2018; Sukhankin November 2018; Знак 2018. Patriot is also owned by Prigozhin but more 
closely resembles a typical PMC. However, its ties to the Russian state remain similar to the Wagner Group’s, and 
Patriot focuses on tasks and areas in which the Wagner Group is not typically involved. In previous work (The 
Future of Warfare: The Impact of the Contemporary Russian Hybrid Warfare Initiative on the United States and its 
Allies; Undergraduate thesis in Russian Studies, mentor Dr. Justin Wilmes; May 2019), I have noted that Patriot is 
not a competitor to Wagner, rather a supplement.  
 
239 Dalaa, Aksoy, Ekip, and Ekberova 2021. Russian-language report from a Turkish news agency.  
 
240 @CITeam_ru.3/22/18; Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021. Reports range from 170 to 450 to over 
1,000.  
 
241 Беленькая 2020; @CITeam_ru 4/23/18; CIT March 15, 2021; Левиев 2018; Мыльников 2019. Wagner was 
present in the capital, Mbaiki, and a military camp 60 kilometers outside of the capital.  
 
242 Левиев January 2019. This article was published by CIT. The photographs show one group of Wagner fighters 
and their truck in Khartoum, at the training camp in the CAR, and on the border.  
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from the same contingent that are present in each state. In Sudan, the Wagner Group has been 
present in South Sudan as well as Khartoum, likely numbering 500 fighters prior to April 
2019.243 In Madagascar, a group of Wagner fighters were sent to the northern and eastern parts of 
the country.244 In Venezuela, the Group has reportedly sent no more than 400 fighters, but this 
number is disputed.245 In Mozambique, 200 fighters were flown into the capitol to conduct 
operations in Kabo-Delgado.246 They were aided by one Wagner-owned helicopter.247 There is a 
minimal Russian military presence in these areas compared to that of the Wagner Group. Most 
frequently, when the Kremlin sends official military personnel to these states, it is in the forms of 
technical specialists, military experts, and intelligence officers.248 In its Global South operations, 
the Kremlin has fully delegated its hands-on functions to the Wagner Group in a manner that 
greatly resembles a state agency.  
Despite an incredibly broad scope of engagement, both operationally and geographically, 
the Wagner Group has not sustained heavy losses with one exception. Wagner’s involvement in 
Mozambique was largely a failure, as the Group has left the country after sustaining repeated 
casualties and retreats while conducting counter insurgency operations.249 
 
243 @CITeam_ru 1/15/19; @CITeam_ru 3/6/18; Cragin and Mackenzie 2020. An interview with a Wagner trainee at 
Molkino revealed the Group’s upcoming deployment to South Sudan in 2018. Reports of Wagner in the capital are 
from 2019.  
 
244 Баданин 2019.  
 
245 Sukhankin January 2019. His source states that the actual number is probably significantly lower.  
 
246 Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021; Flanagan 2019; Lister and Shukla 2019; Sauer November 2019; 
Sukhankin January 2020.  
 
247 Cragin and Mackenzie 2020. They indicate it was “at least one helicopter”.  
 
248 Баданин 2019; CIT March 15, 2021; Мыльников 2019.  
 
249 Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Flanagan 2019; Sauer November 2019; Sukhankin January 2020. Early losses of 5 
fighters grew to become 10 with a reported 20 Mozambiquan soldiers having been killed as well.  
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In the Global South, the Wagner Group has proven to be a highly effective tool of 
Russian foreign policy, engaging in a wide variety of activities. First, Wagner fighters have been 
involved in the training of local military and security forces in Sudan, the CAR, and 
Madagascar.250 The training includes use of Russian small arms and hand to hand combat.251 
Second, the Wagner Group frequently provides security for political figures with close ties to the 
Kremlin, serving as bodyguards and advisors in Sudan, the CAR, and Venezuela.252 As in the 
case of Venezuela and the CAR, this protection is typically prescribed to political figures favored 
by the Kremlin that are facing strong domestic opposition.253 Third, the Wagner Group, in 
collaboration with some of Prigozhin’s other firms, engages in widespread political meddling in 
Sudan, the CAR, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Venezuela.254 This political meddling takes two 
primary forms: the suppression of peaceful protests255 and election interference.256 For example, 
while Wagner was initially deployed to Sudan for different purposes, it had a critical role in the 
suppression of protests in Khartoum.257 Similar situations emerged in Venezuela and 
Madagascar, demonstrating that the protection of pro-Kremlin political elites oftentimes leads to 
 
250 @CITeam 4/23/18; @CITeam 8/1/18; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Marten 2019; Marten January 2019; 
Sukhankin January 2019.  
 
251 @CITeam 4/23/18; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020. CIT published photographs depicting hand to hand combat 
training.  
 
252 Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021; Sukhankin January 2019; Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019.  
 
253 Dalaa et al 2021; Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019. 
 
254 @CITeam_ru 1/11/19; @CITeam_ru 4/11/19; Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Harding and Burke 2019; Sauer 
November 2019; Sukhankin January 2019.  
 
255 @CITeam_ru 1/11/19; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Sukhankin January 2019. 
 
256 @CITeam_ru 4/11/19; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Harding and Burke 2019; Sauer November 2019.  
 
257 @CITeam_ru 1/11/19; Sukhankin January 2019.  
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protest suppression or election interference. Fourth, the Wagner Group has fought opposition 
movements and jihadist insurgencies in Sudan, the CAR, and Mozambique.258  
 Patriot, Wagner’s sister organization, appears to primarily provide security to critical 
persons and sites, avoiding operations in combat zones.259 The two groups complement each 
other. Similar to when the Internet Research Agency was scaled back in favor of other Prigozhin-
owned bot and troll farms, Patriot is being used in areas where Wagner would be unwelcome or 
overqualified.260 Because Patriot is being utilized in this way, it is part of the Wagner 
infrastructure and, therefore, is also a state actor.  
In addition to the aforementioned activities, the Wagner Group is engaged in a high 
degree of rent-seeking activity in the Global South. Much of it is facilitated by Prigozhin’s 
various natural resource extraction firms.261 Similar to Syria, Prigozhin’s companies gain the 
rights to various resource sites in exchange for Wagner training state military or security forces 
and guarding mines.262 The key difference from Syria is that Russian companies are running the 
mines rather than local firms. Wagner is facilitating the mining of natural gas, gold, diamonds, 
 
258 Беленькая 2020; Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021; Sauer November 2019; Sukhankin January 
2020; Знак 2018. Dalaa et al denotes the opposition in the CAR as another insurgency, but Беленькая revealed that 
the CAR government was battling a mobilized opposition. It is my position that Wagner’s combat-related activities 
in the CAR were against an opposition group, whereas in the other states mentioned, the Wagner Group combatted 
jihadist insurgencies. 
 
259 Sukhankin November 2018; Знак 2018.  
 
260 In previous work (The Future of Warfare: The Impact of the Contemporary Russian Hybrid Warfare Initiative on 
the United States and its Allies; Undergraduate thesis in Russian Studies, mentor Dr. Justin Wilmes; May 2019), I 
discuss the Internet Research Agency and its role as a tool of Russian foreign policy and soft power, much like the 
Wagner Group.  
 
261 AFP 2020; CIT March 15, 2021; Harding 2020; Marten 2019; Marten January 2019. The company is M-Invest. 
 
262 AFP 2020; Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021; Marten 2019; Marten September 2020; Мыльников 
2019; Sukhankin January 2020.  
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uranium, and other minerals in the CAR, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, and likely others.263 
In the case of the Venezuelan government’s collapse, it is likely that Russia would deploy 
Wagner fighters to seize critical gas and oil sites,264 but there is no evidence that this has 
happened yet.  
  In its Global South operations, the Wagner Group receives an especially low level of 
support from both the Kremlin and the host-states. In terms of equipment, none is provided by 
either party to Wagner.265 The only contradiction to this consensus is that armaments have been 
delivered alongside reinforcements to Wagner in the CAR.266 Transportation appears to be the 
only means of support provided by the Kremlin to Wagner in the Global South.267 Possibly more 
important than transportation, the Wagner Group also benefits from the diplomatic influence 
attributed to representatives of the Russian government.268 Contracted nonstate actors do not 
receive this particular benefit,269 indicating that the Wagner Group is operating as a Russian state 
actor in the Global South.  
 
 
263 Баданин 2019; @CITeam_ru 8/1/18; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Dalaa et al 2021; Marten 2019; Marten 
January 2019; Sukhankin January 2020.  
 
264 Sukhankin January 2019. 
 
265 Cragin and Mackenzie 2020; Lister and Shukla 2019.  
 
266 Беленькая 2020.  
 
267 Беленькая 2020; Lister and Shukla 2019; Marten September 2020; Sukhankin January 2019; Tsvetkova and 
Zverev 2019. The Wagner Group appears to have frequent and broad access to Russian military aircraft with reports 
of dozens of flights. It appears that Wagner fighters are even flown directly from one state of operation to another 
(e.g. a state in Sub-Saharan Africa to Venezuela).  
 
268 Sauer November 2019. The author is drawing from an interview with South African PMC contractors.  
 
269 Ibid.  
81 
   
III. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group as a State Actor in the Global South 
 Due to the scope of this chapter, in this section I discuss Russian diplomatic, strategic, 
and economic interests in the states where Wagner is involved. In Chapter II, I discussed more 
broadly Russian interests and objectives in the Global South. Russian diplomatic and strategic 
interests in these states are the strategic support of pro-Kremlin elites (typically anti-democratic 
and anti-West oriented individuals),270 the infiltration of states with Russian operatives,271 the 
removal of sanctions on friendly states,272 and the establishment of a permanent Russian military 
presence.273 As was the case in Syria, the Kremlin attempts to overshadow these interests by 
promoting itself as primarily interested in combatting jihadist terrorism.274 It is also important to 
note an additional interest exclusive to the CAR is to establish a conduit for higher mobility in 
future operations.275 Russian economic interests are the removal of sanctions on states with 
 
270 Harding 2020; Harding and Burke 2019; Marten 2019; Marten January 2019. While ideology plays a role, the 
Kremlin also views the development of anti-democratic and anti-West regimes strategically. These regimes are more 
likely to exchange rents for protection, as they are more likely to need the training, security, and political meddling 
services that Wagner is well-versed in supplying. One report suggests a grand strategy of developing a “loyal chain 
of representatives across African territory” and an “African self-identity” may be at work via this form of strategic 
support.  
 
271 Harding 2020; Harding and Burke 2019. Russia is attempting to recruit/place and develop assets in various 
Global South governments to establish artificially crafted closer ties between the two.  
 
272 Harding 2020. There is a specific focus on arms embargoes. 
 
273 Harding 2020; Harding and Burke 2019. In Sudan, the Kremlin and local government agreed to build a new naval 
base for Russian military vessels.  
 
274 Flanagan 2019.  
 
275 Беленькая 2020; Harding and Burke 2019. The Kremlin wants to link its operations between Sudan, the CAR, 
and the DRC via the CAR.  
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lucrative natural resource reserves,276 the expanded investment in local economies,277 and the 
cultivation of and investment in various rents.278 
 In its activities throughout the Global South, the Wagner Group has expressed a high 
degree of alignment with Russian interests. Moreover, it appears that Wagner is the most 
significant tool of foreign policy and soft power sent by the Kremlin to these states and in many 
cases is the only such tool. As previously demonstrated, Wagner supports local pro-Kremlin 
elites, assists in the infiltration of local governments, promotes itself as a counter-insurgency tool 
while actually seizing sites endowed with critical rents, and does so rather independently. It is 
clear that the Kremlin’s grand strategy for Africa is nearly completely being enacted through the 
Wagner Group. The hybrid-PMC’s role as a central and permanent player in the Russian foreign 
policy machine demonstrates that it is a state actor.  
 In the Global South, I identified a shift in Russian state acknowledgment of the Group 
away from the absolute denial of Ukraine and Syria, more clearly demonstrating Wagner’s status 
as a state actor. When asked about the Russian presence in these states, Kremlin officials deny 
that any official Russian military presence exists.279 However, the Kremlin acknowledges the 
presence of Wagner, yet still denies that it is tied to the state.280 The Kremlin has also frequently 
 
276 Harding 2020. Sanctions on Darfur are preventing the mining of uranium and other minerals. It is in both 
Russia’s and Sudan’s interest for mining to commence in Darfur.  
 
277 Lister and Shukla 2019; Sauer November 2019; Sukhankin January 2020. Sukhankin discusses the Venezuela 
example, in which Russia seeks continued investment and has already invested about 17 billion USD.  
 
278 Harding 2020; Marten September 2020.  
 
279 Lister and Shukla 2019; Sukhankin January 2019; Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019. Putin’s spokesman on 
Mozambique – “there are no Russian soldiers there”; on Venezuela “I do not know about the presence of any 
Russian private military companies”, writing it off as a hoax.  
 
280 @CITeam_ru 1/23/19; Мыльников 2019. Such comments have come from Putin and the Russian MFA. 
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and publicly discussed its cooperation with these states, citing Wagner activity as examples of 
such cooperation.281 State television in Russia even ran a story on Wagner in the CAR depicting 
posters that outlined guidelines the fighters were instructed to follow including defending 
Russian state interests and having the candor of a Russian soldier.282 This is a far cry from the 
‘wink and a nod’ style of plausible deniability that the Kremlin typically employs when 
discussing its illicit activities abroad and more similar to the type of plausible deniability states 
afford to their official special forces and intelligence personnel.  
 There is a relatively abundant amount of information on Wagner’s activities in the Global 
South. The availability of such information varies from state to state, but the most critical 
examples are states in which Wagner has had a longstanding presence and more information is 
publicly available, such as the CAR and Sudan. It is likely that Wagner is involved in myriad 
other states throughout the Global South in which its presence is yet to become public 
knowledge. 
 In the Global South, the Wagner Group has experienced a moderate degree of success. It 
has been successful in aggressively and strategically promoting not only the Kremlin’s small-
scale and immediate interests but also its grand strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Wagner 
Group has done so with minimum losses and near-zero direct support from the Russian state. 
However, Wagner’s involvement in the Global South has eroded much of its plausible 
deniability, and its ties to the Russian state have been made increasingly apparent. While the 
 
281 Левиев 2018; Россия 24 2019. This includes comments from Sergey Lavrov.  
 
282 @CITeam_ru 9/30/2019. The guidelines were: “1) Defend the interests of Russia always and everywhere. 2) The 
candor of a Russian soldier above all. 3) Don’t fight for money, but rather out of principle! And principle one is to 
be victorious! 4) Do not let your enemies take you alive […].” Others are included that were not pictured.  
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Wagner Group has been operationally and strategically successful, it has failed in its core 
function – to pursue Russian interests while resembling a nonstate actor.  
 The Wagner Group’s involvement in the Global South has greatly demonstrated that it is 
a state actor. Taking the lead on Russian foreign policy targeting the Global South, the Wagner 
Group has evolved into something resembling its own state agency. Engaging in a wide variety 
of functions that nearly completely cover all of Russia’s diplomatic, strategic, and economic 
interests in the Global South, Wagner has opened itself up for outside observation to a much 
greater degree than it did in Ukraine or Syria. This, the greater public acknowledgement of the 
Wagner Group by Russian policymakers, and the provision of Russian diplomatic backing to 









CHAPTER VII – CASE STUDY: THE LIBYAN INTRASTATE CONFLICT 
 
 
“What is at stake is more than one small country, 
it is a big idea – a new world order where diverse 
nations are drawn together in common cause to  
achieve the universal aspirations of mankind; 
peace and security, freedom and rule of law. Such 
is a world worth of our struggle, and worthy of our 
children’s future. 
 
--President George H.W. Bush 
 
 In this chapter, I explore Wagner Group’s role in the Libyan intrastate conflict. A current 
and continuing example of Wagner activity, the Libya case further demonstrates that the Group 
is a Russian state actor. I discuss how Wagner’s involvement in Libya combines aspects of the 
three previous cases, showing its evolution into an actor resembling a state agency or military 
branch. In this case, I first provide a background on the Libyan conflict. Second, I discuss the 
first set of indicators, profiling Wagner’s role in Libya. Third, I discuss the second set of 
indicators, and demonstrate that the Wagner Group is a Russian state actor.  
 While supporting Khalifa Haftar, the Wagner Group has aggressively pursued Russian 
diplomatic, strategic, and economic interests in the Libyan conflict. In fact, it has done far more 
to expand the Kremlin’s influence over the Libyan National Army (LNA) and construct the 
framework for a permanent Russian presence than it has to win the war for Haftar. In this case, I 
analyze the criteria outlined in Chapter IV, and I demonstrate further that the Wagner Group is a 
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state actor. This chapter showcases Wagner’s ability to operate independently without a Russian 
military presence in-country, while also remaining part of the Russian state structure. It is 
necessary to include this conflict in my thesis, as it is both the most recent case of Wagner 
activity and the case in which Wagner’s full integration into the state structure is most evident.  
 
I. Background on the Libyan Intrastate Conflict 
 The civil war in Libya is a convoluted proxy war that has divided the country nearly 
precisely in half since it began in 2014. There are two primary actors in the conflict: The 
Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj that controls the 
western half of the country and the LNA led by warlord Khalifa Haftar who controls the eastern 
half.283 The proxy actors supporting the GNA are Turkey, Italy, Qatar, the U.N., and the U.S.284 
The proxy actors supporting the LNA are Egypt, France, the U.A.E., and Russia.285 
 Russian involvement began at a point after Haftar requested support from the Kremlin in 
2015, assuring that it would be rewarded with energy deals and access to ports.286 From 2016-
2018, Haftar solidified his holdings in the east, pushing out the Islamic State while the GNA was 
preoccupied by the same jihadists in Sirte.287 By late September, both sides have created their 
own governments and central banks, and a fragile U.N. cease-fire was established.288 The 
 
283 BBC 2021; Robinson 2020.  
 
284 Robinson 2020. The U.N. founded the GNA. U.S. involvement is minimal, but it officially supports the GNA.  
 
285 Ibid.  
 
286 Borshchevskaya 2020.  
 
287 BBC 2021.  
 
288 Council on Foreign Relations 2021.  
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conflict escalated with the onset of Haftar’s Wagner-fueled Tripoli Offensive in April 2019, and 
after over a year of fighting around the capitol, the offensive ended in failure for Haftar in June 
2020.289 Despite Haftar and Wagner’s retreat from Tripoli, the battle resulted in a massive influx 
of foreign fighters, which culminated in an expansion of the conflict and a stalemate at the 
dividing line in the middle of the country.290 It does not appear that the status quo will change in 
the near future, as both sides become increasingly entrenched.  
 
II. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group’s Role in the Libyan Intrastate Conflict 
 The Wagner Group’s presence in Libya has grown significantly since it began in 2017, 
and greatly resembles the presence of a state actor due to its size, scope, and strength. In 2017, 
the first Wagner fighters arrived, likely consisting of around 120 men.291 By 2018, this number 
had risen to “several hundred”.292 Leading up to the Tripoli Offensive, new detachments of 
Wagner fighters began to arrive as early as March 2019.293 Wagner deployments to Libya greatly 
increased in September 2019, surged during the summer of 2019, and reached numbers as high 
as 2,000 men by the end of the Tripoli Offensive in June 2020.294 Reports for 2021 indicate that 
 
289 Al Jazeera February 2020.  
 
290 Al Jazeera February 2020; Faucon and Malsin 2020.  
 
291 Al Jazeera May 2020; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020. Al Jazeera cites the 2020 U.N. report, which revealed that 
122 Wagner fighters were “highly probably operational or have been operational” in Libya. While unconfirmed, this 
cadre of experienced Libya-based Wagner fighters likely were the first sent to participate in the conflict.  
 
292 Bermudez 2020.  
 
293 @CITeam_ru 3/4/19. The telegraph received word that 300 Wagner fighters were traveling to Libya on this day. 
The CIT then tweeted the information on their Russian-language page.  
 
294Al Jazeera May 2020; Венкина 2020; Bermudez 2020; Владимиров 2020; @CITeam_ru 9/27/19; Cragin and 
MacKenzie 2020; Эггерт 2020; Kirkpatrick 2019; Левиев 2020; Miller et al 2021; Nichols 2020; Sukhankin June 
2020. The CIT photographed a stark increase in September 2019.  Miller et al notes that the surge was especially 
strong during the cease-fire in December 2019. Kirkpatrick adds that the uptick included the deployment of 
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2,000 or more Wagner fighters are in Libya.295 Wagner’s presence has spanned large swaths of 
Libyan territory, having reached into Tripoli during the offensive. Since the retreat, the Group is 
present in half of the country, stationed largely on the front line that extends from Sirte to Al 
Jufra airbase and onward to Brak al-Shati, which is about 500 km to the South.296 Wagner is 
likely to remain on the front lines, as it has been constructing a trench extending from Sirte to Al 
Jufra airbase.297  
 Of the Russian state’s presence in the Libyan conflict, the Wagner Group accounts for a 
massive proportion. Typical skirmishes involve less than 400 fighters, and the total number of 
imported fighters is believed to be around 10,000,298 so with Wagner consisting of 2,000 spread 
between three encampments, the Group is a powerful force. Russian GRU and SPETSNAZ were 
also confirmed to have been present in Libya in October 2018, with 10 operatives arriving 
alongside Wagner fighters.299 As they were only involved early-on, it is likely the operatives 
were filling leadership functions, rather than operational ones. The Wagner Group’s complete 
 
specialists with sniper rifles. Nichols reports that a significant increase in support shipments to Wagner (possibly 
indicating an increase in the number of fighters) occurred from January 2020 to June 2020. Левиев notes that a new 
wave of fighters entered Libya in May 2020. Cragin and Mackenzie report numbers ranging from 1200-2000 
fighters, but Sukhankin cites an AFRICOM report indicating that 2000 Wagner fighters were active in Libya. The 
confidential U.N. document reported by myriad journalistic outlets contradicts these accounts, citing numbers 
ranging between 800-1200. Some of the news outlets cited here reported this as being around 1200 fighters, since 
the U.N. appeared to believe actual numbers were on the higher side. Closer to the 2000 number, some Russian 
journalistic sources (Левиев from CIT and Венкина from DW) reported numbers of 1500-1600 Wagner fighters.  
 
295 Dalaa et al 2021; Miller et al 2021; Walsh and Sirgany 2021.  
 
296 Dalaa et al 2021; Fasanotti 2021; Walsh and Sirgany 2021.  
 
297 Walsh and Sirgany 2021. This consists of 70 km of the front line and includes 31 defensive positions, ascertained 
by independent geolocation published originally on Twitter.  
 
298 Kirkpatrick 2019; Walsh and Sirgany 2021.  
 
299 CIT March 13, 2021. Blog post via Facebook from CIT.  
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subordination to the GRU without any high-level private leadership indicates that it is a state 
actor.  
 Wagner’s involvement in the Tripoli Offensive demonstrates that the Kremlin is still 
willing to utilize the fighters as shockwave troops. Widely cited as the Group’s biggest failure in 
the conflict, it appears Wagner held most of the responsibility for Haftar’s loss at Tripoli, failing 
on the front lines, leading the retreat, and sustaining casualties.300 Reporting on casualty rates 
among Wagner fighters is scarce, but the number was as high as 35 fighters in October 2019.301  
 Aside from its failures as a shockwave force in this conflict, the Wagner Group has 
proven highly effective and lethal in other tasks. First, Wagner fighters have implemented the 
use of a broad array of special weaponry typically reserved for the Russian military, including 
mortars/artillery, anti-tank missiles, landmines, fighter jets, UAVs, SAMs, and electronic 
warfare.302 Additionally, Wagner has incorporated reportedly highly lethal sniper teams into its 
Libyan toolkit.303 Second, Wagner has been described as a “force multiplier” for Haftar, largely 
due to the Group’s use of sniper teams and other special weaponry.304 Third, Wagner fighters 
have diversified their skillset, having been confirmed conducting HUMINT-related operations in 
 
300 Bermudez 2020; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Dettmer 2019; Коротков 2020; Левиев September 2019; Miller 
et al 2021. Левиев shows photographic evidence revealing that even an experienced Wagner veteran who had 
received commendations for fighting ISIS in Syria perished in the retreat.  
 
301 Dettmer 2019. This is prior to the height of the Tripoli Offensive. It is likely the number post-June 2020 is 
significantly higher, especially due to the Wagner Group’s role as shockwave troops.  
 
302 Al Jazeera May 2020; Bermudez 2020; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Solomon 2020; U.S. Department of 
Defense 2020; Walsh and Sirgany 2021. The anti-tank missiles and artillery are both precision guided. The 
landmines have reportedly been laid by Libyan fighters alongside Wagner fighters in civilian sectors of Tripoli.  
 
303 Al Jazeera May 2020; Bermudez 2020; Kirkpatrick 2019; Nichols 2020. Both a U.N. report and testimony from 
GNA medics in Libya have confirmed the presence of Wagner sniper teams.  
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Libya.305 In this case, Wagner further establishes itself as a Russian state actor, as it possesses 
the full capabilities allotted only to a branch of the military or state agency while serving as the 
sole promoter of Russian state interests in the conflict.  
 In addition to the aforementioned functions, the Wagner Group engaged in a moderate 
degree of rent-seeking in Libya. The Wagner Group has seized control of two critical Libyan oil 
sites and the deep-water ports in Tobruk and Derna, likely to hold sway over the influx of Libyan 
oil to southern Europe.306 These areas remain deep in Haftar’s zone of control, and it appears 
Wagner is attempting to prevent the reentry of Libyan oil into the international market.307 This is 
directly in line with the Russian state’s interests, as I will discuss later in this chapter.  
 The unprecedently high degree of direct support from the Kremlin to Wagner greatly 
demonstrates the Group’s role as a state actor in the Libyan conflict. First, a massive influx of 
basic reinforcing supplies has been sent to Wagner.308 During the Tripoli Offensive, this totaled 
338 cargo flights, but has since declined.309 Second, Wagner fighters have been provided high-
tech military equipment by the Kremlin typically reserved for the Russian military.310 This has 
 
305 AA 2020. From AA, a Turkish journalistic outlet: two Wagner fighters detained on espionage charges and bailed 
out by Prigozhin. A memory stick found on one of the Wagner fighters confirmed they had recruited Gaddafi’s son 
as an asset and were conspiring with him to take power in Libya.  
 
306 Associated Press 2020; CIT March 13, 2021; Faucon and Malsin 2020.  
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309 Nichols September 2020; Walsh and Sirgany 2021. From November 1, 2019 to July 31, 2020, 338 Russian 
military cargo flights arrived in Libya. This number dropped to over 12 flights per month by the end of 2020. 
 
310 Al Jazeera May 2020; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Kirkpatrick 2019; Solomon 2020; U.S. Department of 
Defense 2020. Solomon cites the AFRICOM deputy director for intelligence, stating that the aircraft provided by the 
Russian military was flown in by military personnel. This validates that it was the Kremlin providing these aircraft.  
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included fighter jets, bomber aircraft, various forms of high-end ordinance, armored vehicles 
with machine guns, Panzers equipped with rocket launchers, drones, and air defense systems.311  
 
III. Discussing Case Criteria: The Wagner Group as a State Actor in Libya 
 The Russian state has two key diplomatic and strategic interests in the Libyan conflict. 
First, the Kremlin aims to use the conflict as means of garnering geopolitical influence, 
increasing its relevance in the region’s/global affairs, and developing a pro-Kremlin regime in 
NATO’s backyard.312 This is especially evident, as Russia cannot cite national security as a 
reason for involvement in the conflict.313 Second, the Kremlin is interested in access to Libya’s 
ports and military bases, which would provide it with a permanent presence bordering southern 
Europe.314 It is important to consider that the conflict’s current stalemate may also be in the 
Kremlin’s interest, as a unified and stable Libya would be less reliant on Russian support.315  
 Additionally, the Kremlin has a few key economic interests in the conflict. First, it 
desires access to or control over Libya’s vast oil reserves.316 The majority are in Haftar-
controlled territory,317 making capturing Tripoli outside of the Kremlin’s immediate economic 
 
311 @CITeam_ru 5/26/20; CIT March 13, 2021; Cragin and MacKenzie 2020; Kirkpatrick 2019; Коротков 2020; 
Левиев September 2019; Левиев 2020; Solomon 2020; U.S. Department of Defense 2020; Walsh and Sirgany 
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coming from Wagner’s Sub-Saharan operations and the UAE in addition to the support directly from Russia.  
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interests. Second, Russia aims to use its control over Libyan oil to improve its ability to leverage 
Western Europe.318 Third, the Kremlin lost $7.5 in contracts upon the fall of the Gaddafi regime, 
and likely aims to revive these agreements with Haftar.319 Even if the conflict remains a 
stalemate, Russia has much to gain as the absence of Libyan oil from the global market has paid 
dividends for the Kremlin.320 
 There is an incredibly high degree of alignment between Wagner’s activities and the 
Kremlin’s interests in this conflict. The Wagner Group very clearly does not serve Haftar, but 
rather the Kremlin, as it aims to maintain the conflict’s status quo, preserve Haftar’s control over 
the more strategic half of the country, and operate as Russia’s tool of great power politics by 
combatting Turkey’s forces. Haftar desires control of the entire country with Tripoli as the 
ultimate prize. Wagner’s current activities do not indicate an upcoming second attempt at 
capturing the capitol. Rather, they appear to be entrenching in the country and increasing their 
influence over the LNA. All of Russia’s interests in the conflict have been achieved by the 
Wagner Group in a direct and coordinated fashion. Wagner’s clear and deliberate pursuit of 
Russian interests in Libya greatly resembles that of a state actor, such as the GRU or a branch of 
the Russian military.  
 As is typical with Wagner involvement, Russia has frequently denied any connection to 
the Group or knowledge of its activities in Libya.321 However, the broad scope and depth of 
support provided directly to the Wagner Group by the Kremlin in Libya shows just how shallow 
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the Kremlin’s plausible deniability and the Group’s ambiguity have become. One account likens 
Wagner’s activities to state-run covert operations.322 The key distinction, however, is that a much 
greater deal of care is placed upon how the secrecy surrounding such operations is maintained. 
Russia did little in Libya to reinforce Wagner’s ambiguity. Consequently, it has become easier to 
dispel.  
 The Wagner Group has proven to be a highly successful tool of Russian foreign policy in 
the Libyan conflict. It has successfully pursued, met, and maintained each of the Kremlin’s 
diplomatic, strategic, and economic objectives in the conflict. Moreover, it has done so with only 
one significant failure (the Tripoli Offensive). Even this one failure, however, turned out to 
benefit Russian interests, as the stalemate has fully entrenched the Kremlin’s presence in and 
expanded its influence over Haftar’s portion of the country. Wagner has proven that it can 
effectively promote Russian state interests in a proxy conflict with many actors and be trusted 
with technology typically reserved for the Russian armed forces.  
 Through its involvement in the Libyan intrastate conflict, it has become increasingly 
clear that the Wagner Group is a state actor. Pursuing and fulfilling the Kremlin’s interests with a 
high degree of precision, Wagner demonstrated close coordination with the state in a manner that 
would not be possible for a nonstate actor. Moreover, the type and scope of support provided by 
the Kremlin to Wagner in this conflict is also indicative of its role as a state actor. A privately 
contracted nonstate actor does not have the unfettered access to state resources that the Wagner 
Group clearly received in this conflict.  
 
 
322 Владимиров 2020.  
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“Addressing recklessness, Russian recklessness  
[…] has become critical to protecting  
our collective security.” 
 
-President Joseph Biden 
 
“Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days 
When large nations trampled small ones in 
Pursuit of territorial ambition.” 
 
-President Barack Obama 
 
 
 Russian foreign policy has benefitted immensely from the incorporation of the Wagner 
Group into its toolkit. Wagner provides quick and direct access to a military organization with an 
operational capacity akin to a state agency or branch of the military. This has allowed the 
Kremlin to relentlessly pursue its foreign policy interests, violating U.N. embargoes and 
liquidating democratic oppositions with a less-than-typical amount of Western backlash. The 
Wagner Group is efficient, highly lethal, and one of the Kremlin’s most valuable assets. 
However, it is not a private organization, as the Russian government claims. Instead, the cases I 
presented in this thesis demonstrate that the Wagner Group is a Russian state actor, because 1) it 
has been fully integrated as a permanent part of the Russian state’s foreign policy infrastructure, 
2) it benefits from all of the resources and privileges typically attributed to a representative of the 
Russian state, 3) it demonstrates a high degree of coordination with the Kremlin’s various 
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military, HUMINT, and special forces state organs, and 4) it exhibited a near-ubiquitous 
coordination between its activities and Russian foreign policy interests in each conflict.  
 
I. The Wagner Group is a Permanent Part of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy 
Infrastructure 
 After the annexation of Crimea, the Wagner Group became increasingly integral in the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy toolkit, and with time the Russian state even began to form parts of its 
foreign policy around Wagner. In Luhansk, the Wagner Group demonstrated its ability to operate 
independently while also remaining subordinate to the Russian state through the GRU for the 
first time. The Kremlin’s policy and strategy for Eastern Ukraine was heavily reliant on the 
Wagner Group, as the hybrid-PMC was held responsible for capturing Luhansk while 
SPETSNAZ and GRU forces took Donetsk. In terms of its operations in Ukraine, Wagner acted 
parallel to official Russian forces, greatly resembling a special forces-type of state actor. As the 
conflict progressed, Wagner became increasingly integral to the Russian foreign policy 
infrastructure in Ukraine. The evidence I presented in Chapter IV revealed that Russian forces 
would have surely lost the battle of Debaltseve and failed to capture Donetsk without Wagner’s 
rush to reinforce the faltering offensive.  
 Wagner’s role as a permanent part of the Kremlin’s foreign policy infrastructure grew 
significantly while in Syria, even expanding into the realm of the state’s military infrastructure. 
The Group engaged in activities that would have received significant backlash from the 
international community if they had been conducted by official Russian military personnel. 
Eliminating democratic opposition groups, strategically capturing rents, and sustaining 
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disproportionately heavy casualties while spearheading offensives, the Wagner Group was 
integral in the Russian state’s success in Syria. This was not due to an affinity among Wagner 
fighters for these types of tactics, but rather it was indicative of their role in Russia’s foreign and 
military policy for Syria. While actual PMCs and state-contracted nonstate actors, such as 
Blackwater, typically engage in the more mundane aspects of warfare (training, staffing bases, or 
providing security),323 the Wagner Group fills specific military functions that are either too 
dangerous or diplomatically precarious for the Russian military.  
 Throughout the Global South, the Wagner Group operates as the sole military-style 
promoter of Russian interests on the ground, greatly indicating its full integration into the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy infrastructure. As I demonstrated in Chapter VI, the publicly available 
data reveals that the Wagner Group serves as the only Russian military presence in the Global 
South. The only key exception is the presence of special forces and HUMINT, which is 
miniscule in comparison. The Wagner Group is the Kremlin’s state agency for its involvement in 
the Global South. Whether Putin wants to prop up a local strongman, seize control of local rents, 
combat a transnational or local insurgency, or stifle local democratic activity, the Wagner Group 
is capable and can effectively execute. Russia is aware of Wagner’s capabilities, and has clearly 
integrated the Group into its foreign policy infrastructure with a present focus on utilizing its 
fighters to carry out a broad and sophisticated campaign for influence over the Global South. 
 Wagner’s involvement in the Libyan conflict reinforces my previous argument. As in the 
case of the Global South, the Wagner Group has served as the sole representative of the Russian 
state in Libya. The key difference, however, is that in Libya Wagner has received a vast amount 
 
323 In previous work, I analyze the similarities and differences between Blackwater PMC/Academi and the Wagner 
Group. While the two share similar origins/original intentions, they have evolved into two incomparable entities. “A 
Tale of Two Private Military Companies: Blackwater versus the Wagner Group”; Dr. Graeme Robertson; May 2020. 
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of direct support from the Kremlin that has been absent in its Sub-Saharan operations. In Libya, 
the Wagner Group continues to operate as a state agency but also incorporates some of the 
functions typically attributed to a branch of the military, similar to its involvement in Syria. This 
full scope of operations coupled with the extensive Kremlin support further characterizes the 
Group as a state actor, operating as the Russian Federation’s agency for hybrid warfare. No 
Russian policy for direct involvement in Libya would exist without the Wagner Group, and the 
Kremlin’s complete reliance on and involvement through the hybrid-PMC further indicates that 
it is a state actor. This case demonstrates that the concept of Wagner as a Russian state agency is 
not confined to small conflicts and influence operations in the Global South, but that it can also 
be applied to a full intrastate conflict or proxy war.  
 
II. The Wagner Group Receives Resources and Privileges Typically Reserved for Arms of 
the Russian State 
 Beginning in Ukraine, the Wagner Group benefitted from a vast amount of support from 
the Russian state. Whether transportation or equipment, the Russian state provided Wagner with 
the tools necessary to operate in the conflict. Most notably, however, was the provision of 
instruction, a command structure, and a direct line of communication to the Kremlin. As is 
evident from the various phone calls I discuss in Chapter IV, Utkin does not appear to have 
operated at any stage in the conflict without the approval and direction of the Russian General 
Staff. This is not typical of nonstate actors, which are typically responsible to a state in the 
context of a patron-client relationships but also possess their own private command structures. In 
Ukraine, the support provided to Wagner indicates that it is a state actor, as it greatly resembles a 
specialized sub-division typically found in an intelligence or special forces-related agency.  
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 The Kremlin’s provision of direct support to Wagner in Syria expanded dramatically, 
reflecting the Group’s greater integration into the state’s foreign policy and military 
infrastructure. In Syria, the Wagner Group was treated equal to the military by the Russian state. 
Its fighters benefitted from nearly all of the same support and privileges as Russian military 
personnel, even in areas where the two were not operating in tandem. Russia demonstrated just 
how highly it valued the Wagner Group as a tool of foreign and military policy in Syria by 
showing how much it was willing to invest in the hybrid-PMC’s success. This investment was 
comparable to the amount of support any state would provide to one of its intelligence or military 
organs when engaging in a conflict of this size, and it was greatly indicative of Wagner’s status 
as a state actor.  
 As I demonstrated in Chapter VI, the Wagner Group received a low level of resource-
based direct support from the Kremlin during its operations in the Global South. Conversely, the 
privileges allotted to the Group were expanded to completely represent those typically provided 
to intelligence and special forces personnel operating covertly overseas. Most important was the 
Russian state’s provision of full diplomatic backing and responsibility to the Wagner Group. In 
the Global South, the hybrid-PMC nearly independently promoted the Kremlin’s interests and 
was viewed as representatives of the Russian state by the local governments with which it was 
working. Contracted nonstate actors, even those that have close and continuing relationships with 
their respective state, are never allotted the status of official representatives of their employer. In 
contrast, the Wagner Group operates as a Russian state actor in the Global South, liaising 
between the Kremlin and local allies in a manner similar to GRU or SPETSNAZ officers. The 
Wagner Group effectively resembles a Russian state intelligence or special forces agency in the 
Global South.  
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 In Libya, the amount of Kremlin support provided to the Wagner Group expanded to 
encompass all of the resources and privileges that are typically allotted to official state 
representatives. During this conflict, Wagner continued to receive the full diplomatic backing 
and broad scope of responsibility for Russian foreign policy that it experienced in its operations 
throughout the Global South. In addition, the hybrid-PMC received unprecedently vast resource-
based support from the Kremlin, as I outlined in Chapter VII. This combination is critical. While 
some nonstate actors have historically received high quantities of state material support, none 
have received it to this degree while also being the sole actor responsible for its use in the pursuit 
of state interests in one conflict. The support provided to Wagner in Libya demonstrates that it is 
a state actor, as the Group is privy to all benefits that representing a state in a conflict comes 
with. 
 It is possible that some may argue that as Russian citizens, Wagner fighters would 
receive the Russian state’s full diplomatic backing regardless of their affiliation with the Group. 
However, it is necessary to consider that many of Wagner’s fighters are of non-Russian 
nationalities and do not hold Russian citizenship. It is most significant that the full diplomatic 
backing of the Russian state is provided to the institution of the Wagner Group as a whole, which 
is indicative of its status as a state actor.  
 
III. The Wagner Group Demonstrates a High Level of Coordination with Other Russian 
State Organs 
 Since its origins in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the Wagner Group has exhibited close 
coordination with Russian military, special forces, or intelligence (depending on which was 
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present in each conflict) that indicates a complementary relationship between the two. In 
Ukraine, the coordination was clearly occurring at the highest levels of the Russian government, 
as Utkin’s phone calls with members of the Russian General Staff among other evidence 
presented in Chapter IV revealed. The coordinated offensive between Russian SPETSNAZ and 
the Wagner Group in Luhansk and Donetsk allowed Russia to gain such a strong foothold in the 
country. This demonstrated that in Ukraine Wagner served the Russian state, for the benefit of 
the Russian state, and in pursuit of Russia’s grand strategy for the conflict. A nonstate actor 
would not meet these criteria with such precision. 
 The Wagner Group demonstrated a similar type of coordination with other Russian forces 
in Syria, but on a larger scale considering the Group was operating alongside the entirety of the 
Russian military rather than just Russian special forces. Like in Ukraine, the coordination 
between the Wagner Group and official Russian military forces in Syria revealed that both 
parties were likely being directed by the same high-ranking Kremlin officials. Up until the 
Russian military’s exit from the conflict, Wagner complemented the military’s operations by 
engaging in the most deadly and controversial tasks. When ambiguity is required, the Wagner 
Group steps in, and the Russian military steps away. The relationship between the two and their 
shared leadership in the Kremlin greatly resembles interactions between two state actors, not one 
state and one nonstate actor. Wagner simply does not appear to have any private interests or 
leadership when it is operating alongside the Russian military.  
 Regarding Wagner’s involvement in both Russian power projection in the Global South 
and the Libyan conflict, less coordination with other Russian forces exists due to the near-total 
absence of other Russian forces. However, some key points of evidence presented in Chapters VI 
and VII indicated that rather than disappearing, this coordination simply changed form. In both 
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Madagascar and Libya, GRU and SPETSNAZ forces arrived with the early detachments of 
Wagner fighters, likely supplementing the Group’s operations by liaising between the Kremlin 
and local elites. While Russia did not establish an official military presence in Libya, it did 
engage in a broad campaign of non-military support to the Libyan state. Wagner, conversely, 
took the lead on providing kinetic, military support to Haftar’s faction. The Group’s operations 
and presence overall effectively complement the Russian state’s extra-military operations 
propping up the warlord. Its status as the sole representative of the Kremlin on the ground and its 
effective coordination with other forms of Russian involvement in the conflict makes Wagner’s 
role as a Russian state actor in Libya all the clearer.  
 Despite this evidence, whataboutisms may emerge suggesting this is no different from the 
way the U.S. and other states integrate PMCs into their military structures. There are two key 
differences between this and Wagner’s complementary relationship with rest of the Russian 
military and intelligence community. First, as I discuss previously in this paper, the Wagner 
Group’s full immersion into the kleptocratic structure of the Russian regime makes it a hybrid-
PMC, thus it is more unilaterally beholden to Russian state and kleptocratic interests than a PMC 
serving a liberal-democratic regime could possibly be. Second, other PMCs are private, have 
private interests, a separate private leadership, and operate on the basis of strictly defined 
contracts. Moreover, such PMCs do not operate in a manner that is as complementary to their 
patron’s military as does the Wagner Group. Typically, PMCs serve supplemental functions, as I 
noted previously. The Wagner Group’s seamless and complementary coordination with the 




   
IV. The Wagner Group’s Activities Exhibit a High Degree of Coordination with Russian 
State Interests Everywhere that it is Involved 
 In all four cases presented in this thesis, I demonstrate that the Wagner Group 
consistently expresses a very high degree of coordination with Russian state interests. Moreover, 
it appears to lack its own concrete interests outside of those typically attributed to any arm of 
government bureaucracy. Wagner’s activities in each conflict align with the bigger picture of 
Russian foreign policy respective to each state or regional grand strategy. Its attempts to promote 
Russian interests are deliberate in nature, further indicating that a high degree of operational 
coordination exists between the Wagner Group and the rest of the Russian state.   
 Moreover, I argue that this coordination is indicative of a larger, global strategy at play. 
The Kremlin utilizes the Wagner Group for a specific purpose, similar to how other states have 
certain agencies that are responsible for pursuing niche interests. Wagner’s ambiguity, however, 
greatly broadens its scope, both geographically and operationally. By tracing the Wagner 
Group’s involvement in Ukraine and Syria to various states throughout the Global South and the 
Libyan conflict, clear trends emerge. These reveal the objectives behind one component of 
Russia’s global hybrid warfare campaign against the U.S. and its allies.  
 First, the Kremlin uses the Wagner Group to strategically secure rents, garnering both 
long-term and short-term economic returns. The capital brought by the seizure of these resources 
alone is valuable. Moreover, the rent-seeking agreements the Kremlin strikes with local elites 
through the Wagner Group serve as alternative means of income for the Russian government that 
sit outside of the reach of Western sanctions. These agreements also often serve as a means of 
expanding Russian soft power. While other states, such as China, engage in similar campaigns 
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by different means, Russia’s use of the Wagner Group and its ambiguity to do so is typical of its 
ongoing global hybrid warfare campaign.   
 Second, the Wagner Group works to reshape geopolitics in Russia’s favor, which is 
another key objective of the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare campaign. By supporting autocratic 
regimes and opposition leaders, Wagner serves as the Kremlin’s primary kinetic tool for 
autocracy promotion. This accompanies its rent-seeking activities, as the Wagner Group takes a 
leading role in Russia’s construction of an illiberal democratic and autocratic coalition aimed at 
defeating Western liberal democratic states, institutions, and alliances.  
 Third, as I demonstrate in this thesis and further elaborate on in other work, the Wagner 
Group supports other arms of Russian hybrid warfare in pursuit of the campaign’s central goal of 
destabilizing and delegitimizing the West and liberal democratic institutions until they reach a 
point of equal competition with the Russian state.324 Whether by the means of coordinating with 
Russian HUMINT, supporting disinformation campaigns and election interference across the 
Global South, improving the Kremlin’s capabilities to conduct offensive economic measures, or 
sabotaging Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, the Wagner Group has proven to be the Russian 






324 “The Future of Warfare: The Impact of the Contemporary Russian Hybrid Warfare Initiative on the United States 
and its Allies”; Mentor: Dr. Justin Wilmes; May 2019.  
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V. The Wagner Group as a Russian State Actor 
It is evident that the Wagner Group is a Russian state actor from its full and permanent 
integration into the Kremlin’s foreign policy infrastructure, its receipt of all the resources and 
privileges allotted to representatives of the Russian state, its demonstration of a high degree of 
deliberate coordination with other Russian state actors, and its broad pursuit of Russian foreign 
policy interests abroad. This designation serves a critical first step towards dispelling the 
ambiguity which gives Wagner its power in contemporary geopolitics. In the following section, I 
provide a series of policy recommendations, which aim to serve as next steps towards curbing 
the Wagner Group’s activities and hindering the Kremlin’s ability to pursue its ongoing 
campaign of hybrid war.  
 
VI. Policy Recommendations 
  With its ambiguity dispelled, the U.S. and its allies must hold Russia accountable for the 
Wagner Group’s actions. Through Wagner, the Russian state has aggressively pursued its foreign 
policy objectives with no structured or informal accountability. This has permitted the Kremlin 
to engage in unfettered and unaccountable hostile acts of war that are incompatible with the 
West’s liberal democratic values. It is in the West’s strategic and ideological interests to pursue 
an aggressive policy response geared at countering the proliferation of Wagner activity, 
expelling the Group from its current areas of operation, and holding the Kremlin accountable.  
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 I recommend that the U.S. government reinforces and codifies Wagner’s label as a state 
actor. U.S. policymakers should draw from the proposed “Name the Enemy Act”325 but legislate 
that all actors integrated into the Russian hybrid warfare structure must be exclusively referred to 
as Russian state actors. A codified designation aims to promote consistency between 
administrations, and it requires the U.S. government to regard Wagner acts of aggression as 
Russian state aggression. This warrants a military, or at least a covert action, response to Russian 
invasions of sovereign soil through the Wagner Group. As included in the current bill, this 
legislation should also encourage other states, especially Western liberal democratic allies, to 
apply the same labels.  
 In retaliation, the Kremlin may announce that it will apply similar labels to U.S. PMCs. 
This is not a concern due to one key difference between U.S. PMCs and the Wagner Group. U.S. 
PMCs typically operate alongside U.S. military forces out of U.S. bases overseas. As current 
trends indicate, the Wagner Group is increasingly operating independently, so it remains 
vulnerable to a Western response while U.S. PMCs remain secure from such retaliation.  
 I also recommend that the U.S. government adopt a counter-proliferation policy in 
response to the Wagner Group. This policy would extend to all hybrid-PMCs, yet the absence of 
other prominent hybrid-PMCs means that Wagner is the primary actor that would be affected.326 
Such a policy must include heavy sanctions against states that invite the Wagner Group. This 
aims to limit the spread of Wagner throughout the Global South. Some states such as Venezuela, 
 
325 U.S. House, Foreign Affairs 2020. Designed to require U.S. government entities to refer to China’s head of state 
as General Secretary rather than President in response to the Chinese government’s various crimes. Full text of the 
bill can be found at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7981/text?r=14&s=1 
 
326 Sukhankin May 2020. The author discusses Chinese PMCs, which may fit the into the category of hybrid-PMCs. 
They are less successful and less central to their state’s foreign policy than the Wagner Group.  
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however, may be less affected by or more apathetic towards sanctions. In this case, it is critical to 
also heavily sanction states that allow the Wagner Group to travel through their territory or those 
that provide any manner of support to the hybrid-PMC. Finally, the U.S. and its allies need to 
further enforce the counter-proliferation policy by working to expel the Group from each state in 
which it is currently present. It would likely be most effective to use special forces and other 
forms of covert action in enforcing this policy, if necessary.  
 There is an imminent need for these policies, and the world is likely to face serious 
consequences if hybrid-PMCs and their activities are allowed to proliferate. The U.S. and its 
allies need to adopt a more aggressive response to these violations of international norms and 
acts of war. These policies are not interested in pulling the West into a war with Russia but are 
rather aimed towards avoiding a much more serious global conflict in the future. The growth and 
normalization of employing thin veils of plausible deniability to recklessly and aggressively 
pursue state interests opens a Pandora’s Box. It is only a matter of time until the Wagner Group 
or a similar state actor crosses a line, escalating a proxy war or smaller conflict into a larger 
interstate conflict with much more severe consequences. Much like before the First World War, 
we are entering a new age of great power competition. Liberal democracies must increase their 
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